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Abstract 
 
Essays on Low-Income Communities and Crime 
 
Kaitlyn R. Harger 
 
 This dissertation is a collection of essays examining issues related to low-income 
communities and criminal behavior.  The first chapter of this dissertation provides an 
introduction to policies used to aid disadvantaged communities and marginalized populations.  It 
also provides an outline of the research agenda of the dissertation as a whole. Chapter 2 
examines the role of the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) in attracting new businesses and 
employment to low-income communities.  This federal tax credit program was designed to 
increase investment in eligible communities by offering private investors a federal-income tax 
credit in exchange for investment.  The results suggest that the program did attract new 
businesses and employment to these areas, primarily in the FIRE and services industries.  
Chapter 3 empirically analyses the relationship between tattoo visibility and recidivism for ex-
offenders.  I construct two measures of visibility, which are dependent on workplace attire.  The 
results from this chapter suggest that inmates with visible tattoos are more likely to return to 
prison and do so faster and more often than inmates with less-visible tattoos.  Chapter 4 
examines whether distance between an offender’s residence and incarceration facility affects 
recidivism.  Results from OLS regressions and survival analysis both suggest that as distance 
increases, offenders are less likely to return to prison in the future.  Chapter 5 summarizes the 
findings in chapters 2 through 4 and discusses related future projects in these areas. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Public Policy, Low-Income Communities, and Crime 
 
Many communities within the United States face issues related to poverty, unemployment, and 
crime.  As a result, policymakers are constantly searching for ways to eliminate these issues.  
Federal, state, and local governments all provide programs to try to assist with alleviating 
problems in low-income communities within the United States.   
 Location-based policies are one method by which policymakers attempt to increase 
economic opportunities for residents living in struggling areas.  Often the goal of policies of this 
type is to increase employment opportunities for residents within the targeted areas.  A great deal 
of research has examined how to best achieve the goals of improving communities facing high 
unemployment, poverty, and crime rates.  Some policies within the United States aim to increase 
employment by subsidizing either capital or labor. One example of a program which provides a 
labor subsidy is the Empowerment Zone (EZ) program within the United States.  Other programs 
offer tax credits on capital to attract new businesses to struggling areas.  I examine one such 
policy, the New Markets Tax Credit, in the second chapter of my dissertation. 
 Research on location-based programs’ ability to attract new businesses has found mixed 
results, with some studies finding programs do attract new businesses and others finding no 
effect.  It is possible that industry-specific trends underlying overall results are confounding the 
findings within these analyses.  Given that tax credit programs within the United States are 
usually a credit on capital or labor, policies of this type should be expected to attract different 
types of businesses depending on whether they target capital or labor.  Analyses that examine the 
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overall effect of policies targeting labor or capital may be missing the underlying industry effects 
that result from the program.  
Recent contributions to the literature by Hanson and Rohlin (2011) and Patrick (2014) 
argue that there are heterogeneous effects of policies across different types of industries.  This 
suggests that programs which cheapen the cost of capital should be expected to attract firms with 
more capital-intensive initial costs relative to those with labor intensive costs.  For example, if 
the cost of capital becomes relatively cheaper due to a subsidy on capital, we should expect to 
see firms in that area take advantage of this cheapened capital by making capital improvements.   
Although placed-based programs are often designed to attract new businesses, 
policymakers only care about new businesses to the extent to which they create new 
employment.  New business growth is one of the key drivers of employment growth for low-
income communities.  In 2005, approximately 3.5 million new jobs were created by new 
businesses, dramatically more than any other firm-age category (Haltiwanger et al., 2013).  In 
order to help lagging areas, policy makers at all levels of government enact legislation with the 
goal of attracting new firms.  This idea, known as “economic gardening,” is emphasized by 
Neumark et al. (2007) who stated that “new firms contribute substantially to job creation.” 
 The second chapter of my dissertation examines whether the NMTC program is effective 
in attracting new businesses and employment to disadvantaged communities within the US.  
Given that the NMTC is a capital tax credit, an industry-specific analysis of the program’s 
effects contributes to the literature by improving our understanding of the effects of subsidizing 
capital in low-income communities, potentially at the expense of unskilled labor.   
Incarceration and crime rates have also recently received a great deal of attention within 
US public policy debates.  As such, the determinants of criminal activity and incarceration are 
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the focus of many research programs in public policy, criminology, and economics.  A particular 
emphasis has been placed on the analysis of the behavior of repeat offenders with research 
examining ways to break the cycle of crime.  
An increasing area of the literature on crime and recidivism examines the role of 
employment in breaking this cycle of repeat imprisonment.  Ex-offenders are particularly 
important labor force participants because research suggests that employment post-release is 
important for reducing the likelihood of criminal activity and incarceration in the future. One 
area that has received little attention within this research is the role that personal appearance 
plays in labor force reentry.  
Some research has also focused on how prison conditions affect future crimes of inmates, 
examining whether ‘harsher’ policies provide better or worse outcomes upon release.  One area 
of debate in this literature concerns whether housing inmates close to home, positively or 
negatively affects crime in the future.  Several previous studies suggest that familial support and 
visitation while incarcerated is associated with a lower likelihood of recidivism upon release 
(Bales and Mears, 2008; Duwe and Clark, 2011).  However, differential effects may exist 
depending on the relationship between the inmate and the visitor.  For example, Duwe and Clark 
(2011) find evidence that visits from ex-spouses increase the risk of future criminal activity. 
Bedard and Helland (2004) present an alternative view, arguing that as prisons are sited in more 
isolated conditions, the female crime rate declines.  They suggest that as the expected distance 
between home and incarceration facility increases, the likelihood of visitation while incarcerated 
declines, and as a result women are deterred from committing potential crimes.  In chapter 4, I 
examine how the experience of being housed far from home affects the future criminal behavior 
of offenders. 
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1.2 Dissertation Research Agenda 
There are three research essays included in this dissertation that examine the effects of public 
policy on low-income communities and crime.  The first essay, Chapter 2, is coauthored with 
Amanda Ross and examines the role of a specific place based-policy on new business location in 
low-income communities.  Chapter 3 looks at the role that visible tattoos play in the likelihood 
that an ex-offender returns to prison and chapter 4 focuses on how distance between an 
offender’s residence and prison may affect future recidivism rates.  Chapter 5 concludes with an 
overview of the findings presented in chapters 2 through 4.   
In the second chapter of my dissertation Amanda Ross and I examine whether the New 
Markets Tax Credit Program (NMTC) attracts new businesses or employment to distressed 
communities in the United States.  The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 first 
established the NMTC program, and the tax credit has been renewed every year since 
implementation.  While the program was established in 2000, the first tax credits were not 
allocated until 2003 (Freedman, 2012; Abravanel et al., 2013). The goal of the program was to 
combine government and private funds to increase investment in low-income communities by 
$15 billion over the next five years (Groves, 2006; Rubin & Stankiewicz, 2005).   Although the 
NMTC program is similar to other location-based tax incentives, it is somewhat unique in that it 
aims to increase investment in eligible communities by using tax credits to mitigate some of the 
risk of opening a business in a low-income area. However, the tax credit is not large enough to 
remove all risk and is likely to avoid overinvestment (Freedman 2012).   
While firms could receive the NMTC for various types of investment, in practice the 
majority of the funds went towards capital investments.  The tax credit could be used for labor 
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expenses, typically referred to as “business purposes,” but this type of expenditure was 
infrequent.  The tax credit was allocated over seven years, and to renew the credit certain criteria 
had to be verified each year.  Given the yearly requirements that firms had to meet to keep the 
tax credit, as well as the abundance of other tax credits available for labor purposes, most of the 
funds allocated through the NMTC went towards capital expenditures.  According to Abravanel 
et al. (2013), 46% of the projects funded by the NMTC were used for office, retail, mixed use, or 
hotel development.  The remaining projects were split up as follows: 22% to social services, 
educational, or cultural/arts use, 18% to manufacturing, industrial, or agricultural uses, 9% to 
health facilities, and 5% to housing.  This breakdown of the expenditures of the program further 
demonstrates that the tax credit allocations went towards more capital intensive projects. 
We use the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) to determine the effect of a capital tax 
credit on where firms in different industries locate.  When estimating the impact of the tax credit 
on business location, there are likely to be unobservable local characteristics that are correlated 
with business location decisions that would cause OLS estimates to be biased.  To control for 
this endogenous selection, we use a plausibly exogenous eligibility cutoff and compare census 
tracts that are just eligible for the NMTC to those that are just ineligible.  Using data from the 
Dun and Bradstreet MarketPlace Files, we find that in Metropolitan Statistical Areas, the NMTC 
incentivized new businesses to locate in tracts that were eligible for the tax credit.  However, we 
find that these positive effects on employment are concentrated in a few industries, specifically 
services and financial services, insurance, and real estate.  This result is consistent with previous 
work that has argued capital tax credits may have negative impacts on employment, as the 
program changes the relative price of capital and may cause firms to substitute away from low-
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skilled workers towards capital investment.  Our results are important for policy makers, as we 
find that capital tax credits have adverse consequences on labor markets for some industries. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship between recidivism and one aspect of an ex-
offender’s personal appearance, visible tattoos. Many ex-offenders have visible tattoos which 
may limit their employment opportunities.  Conventional wisdom suggests that individuals with 
tattoos visible in the workplace may have fewer employment opportunities than people with 
similar qualifications and no visible tattoos. Visible tattoos may create even more of an 
employment barrier for the ex-offender population because potential employers may interpret the 
tattoos (correctly or incorrectly) as signals of criminality. 
Research on criminal signaling mechanisms details how some criminals use tattoos as a 
visual résumé for their prior criminal acts (Gambetta, 2009). If employers are aware that tattoos 
are used to signal criminality, then while interviewing potential employees from a pool of ex-
offenders, non-tattooed or non-visibly tattooed ex-offenders may seem more reformed than ex-
offenders with visible tattoos. In this chapter, I examine whether inmates with visible tattoos 
return to incarceration faster than non-tattooed inmates. 
Two recent criminology studies also attempt to estimate the relationship between visible 
tattoos and recidivism. Lozano et al. (2010) consider a small sample of inmates with prison 
tattoos, inmates with non-prison tattoos, and college students. The results from their study 
suggest that inmates with prison tattoos score higher on recidivism risk assessments than inmates 
without prison tattoos and college students. Waters (2012) expands upon Lozano et al. (2010) 
using data from the FDOC and examines the relationship between visible tattoos and the 
occurrence of recidivism within the last three years. The results suggest that inmates with visible 
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tattoos are more likely to be reconvicted for new felony offenses and new violent offenses within 
three years.  
Although these studies take a first step at linking tattoos to recidivism, both have 
important limitations. Lozano et al. (2010) use a sample of 274 inmates and college students and 
examine the correlations between tattoo and criminal history variables. It is possible that the 
relationships found within their data are a function of this small sample size. Additionally, no 
regression analysis is used within their study, so they are unable to control for other factors 
related to recidivism. Waters (2012) builds on the work by Lozano et al. (2010) using logistic 
regressions to examine the likelihood of recidivism for inmates based on tattoo visibility. 
However, Waters (2012) considers only whether or not an inmate returned to prison, and fails to 
account for the timing of recidivism within the three year follow-up period. In that case, an 
inmate who returns to prison on the last day of the three year period he considers is treated 
identically to an inmate who returns to prison on the first day post-release.  
I contribute to this literature by examining the relationship between visible tattoos and 
recidivism. Conventional wisdom suggests that some employers may choose not to hire 
applicants with visible tattoos, assuming the tattoos signal something unobservable about the 
potential employees. Additionally, research on recidivism suggests that employment post-release 
is a main determinant of whether an ex-offender returns to prison. Combining these two 
literatures suggests a relationship may exist between visible tattoos and the number of days an 
ex-offender lives in society without returning to prison. Using data from the Florida Department 
of Corrections, I estimate a log-logistic survival model and compare the estimated number of 
days until reincarceration for inmates with and without visible tattoos. The findings suggest that 
inmates with visible tattoos return to incarceration faster than those without tattoos or with 
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tattoos easily hidden by clothing. This suggests that programs advocating for tattoo removal or 
coverage during interviews may be helpful for increasing employment chances and reducing 
recidivism. 
In Chapter 4, I examine the relationship between distance between residence and 
incarceration and recidivism.  Findings from criminological research on  prison visitation 
suggests that visitations serve to decrease the likelihood of recidivism in the future as they allow 
the inmate to keep in contact with family and friends while in prison (Liu et al., 2014).  This 
continued connection with the outside world allows the inmate to maintain social ties which can 
potentially affect recidivism risk post release. However, the mechanism through which 
recidivism risk is affected may be dependent on the relationship between the inmate and visitor.   
These previous studies suggest that when visitations do occur, they have the potential to 
decrease future criminal activity.  However, not all inmates receive visits while incarcerated.  
Duwe and Clark (2011) report that 39% of inmates are never visited during incarceration.  A 
variety of factors, including individual characteristics may affect whether or not an inmate 
receives visitors while serving time.  A main barrier to visitation reported by relatives and friends 
of prisoners is the cost of transportation to the prison (Bedard and Helland, 2004). 
The potential effects of serving time in an isolated condition on an inmate’s social 
connections are well documented within the literature.  However, the relationship between 
distance and crime has received far less attention.  Bedard and Helland (2004) use natural 
variation in the expansion of women’s prisons to examine the effects of prison isolation on 
female crime rates.  Their results suggest that an increase the expected distance between 
residence and incarceration facility causes a decrease in the female crime rate.  This evidence of 
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the deterrent effect of prison isolation is in line with Becker’s (1968) theory of the economics of 
crime.  
In Chapter 4, I examine how the distance between incarceration facility and residence is 
related to the likelihood of recidivism for an inmate.  Research suggests that as the distance 
between prison and home increases, the likelihood of visitation while incarcerated decreases.  
This lack of visitation at geographically isolated prisons has been shown to have a deterrent 
effect on crimes committed by female offenders.  However, if the deterrence is driven by the 
inability to consume utility from visitation, then all offenders should be less likely to commit 
crimes as the expected distance increases. Using data from the Florida Department of 
Corrections (FDOC) Offender Based Information System (OBIS), I estimate a survival model to 
examine the relationship between distance and the timing and occurrence of recidivism.  The 
results suggest that inmates incarcerated farther away from home survive in society longer before 
reincarceration.  Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in distance is associated with a 
166 day decrease in the expected number of days before an inmate returns to prison.  This result 
is consistent with previous work which finds that geographic isolation of prison serves as a 
deterrent effect for female offenders.  The findings within this paper are important for policy 
makers in search of cost effective ways to reduce future crime.   
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Chapter 2 
Do Capital Tax Incentives Attract New Businesses? 
Evidence across Industries from the New Markets Tax Credit 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
New businesses are considered to be a key driver of local economic growth in the United States.  
Since new establishments are so important to the local economy, policy makers design tax 
programs to attract new businesses with the hope that these enterprises will drive future growth 
within their jurisdiction (Neumark et al., 2007).  These tax policies are typically place-based 
policies, where a business is eligible to receive the credit if it locates in a specific area, typically 
low-income or high-poverty census tracts.  In general, research that has estimated the impact of 
tax policy on where businesses locate has produced mixed results, with some researchers finding 
tax credits attract new establishments while others find no significant effect.1 
 One explanation for the discrepancy regarding the effect of place-based programs on 
business location decisions is that there are heterogenous effects of policies across different types 
of industries (Hanson & Rohlin, 2011b; Patrick, 2014).  For example, the government could offer 
a tax credit to firms that locate in a specific area and hire workers from that jurisdiction.2  A 
program such as this effectively creates a labor subsidy for businesses to locate in the area, so we 
expect industries that are more labor-intensive to outbid industries that are more capital-intensive 
for land in the area that are eligible for the tax credit.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For example, there is an extensive literature that has looked at the impact of the Enterprise Zone program on 
business location decisions (see Oakley & Tsao (2006), Hanson (2009), Krupka & Noonan (2009), Hanson & 
Rohlin (2011a) and (2011b), and Busso, Gregory, & Kline (2013) for more information) 
2 This type of program would be similar to the Enterprise Zone (EZ) program, though there are other conditions of 
the EZ program which we do not consider in this simple example. 
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In this paper, we use the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) to determine the effect of a 
capital investment tax credit on the location decisions of new businesses and employment.  We 
consider not only the effect of the policy on all types of establishments, but also how the effect 
of the policy varies across firms in different industries.  The NMTC, which was passed in 2000 
but the first credits were not allocated until 2003, provides a tax credit to businesses to make 
investments in low-income communities.3  While the NMTC could be used for a variety of 
purposes, including labor expenses, in practice the credit was used primarily for capital 
investments, so we will refer to this program as a capital tax credit.4 
One of the issues when estimating the effect of a place-based tax credit on business 
location decisions is that there is likely to be a non-random selection of communities by both 
businesses and policy makers.  First, businesses choose which neighborhood to locate in based 
on numerous local attributes, some of which are observable, such as the poverty rate and racial 
composition, and others that are unobservable, such as agglomeration economies.  If these 
unobserved attributes are correlated with where the NMTC is allocated, then simple OLS 
estimates would produce biased results.  Second, there is a selection process with regards to 
which businesses receive the tax credit.  Not all applicants for the NMTC receive the credit.  
Therefore, to compare those businesses that received the tax credit to those that did not would be 
problematic if firms were selected for the program based on expected growth in the local area.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Other papers that have looked at the economic impact of the NMTC are Gurley-Calvez et al. (2009), Freedman 
(2012), and Freedman (2013).  We discuss each of these papers in more detail later. 
4 The NMTC could be used for labor expenses, commonly referred to in the program as “other business” expenses.  
However, due to the required materials to receive the NMTC over the entire life of the program, most applicants did 
not apply for labor assistance.  In addition, most other existing tax credit programs are aimed at hiring workers.  
Given the flexibility of the NMTC, many project managers argued it was their only source of funding for capital 
expenditures, whereas labor expenditures could be funded by other programs.  As a result, in practice the majority of 
projects used the NMTC for capital expenditures.  For more information on the types of projects these funds went to, 
please see http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664717.pdf and http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412958-
new-markets-tax-final.pdf. 
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To control for these factors and obtain causal estimates, we draw upon a plausibly 
exogenous eligibility cutoff in the NMTC to determine whether or not the program attracted new 
business activity.  Eligibility for the NMTC program is based on the ratio of the census tract 
median family income (MFI) to the state MFI or MSA MFI, whichever is higher, which we refer 
to as the income eligibility ratio.  To be eligible to receive the NMTC, the income eligibility ratio 
in a given census tract must be less than or equal to 0.80.5  We use whether or not a census tract 
falls just above or below this cutoff as exogenous variation to estimate the effect of the NMTC 
on business location decisions.  Note that we do not know whether or not a specific business was 
allocated the tax credit, only if a business that located in a tract that was eligible to receive the 
credit.  By comparing business activity in tracts that just qualify to receive the NMTC to those 
that just fail to qualify, we are able to control for unobserved local attributes.  In addition, by 
focusing on eligibility, not the actual allocation of the tax credit, we are able to remove any 
concerns regarding the endogenous selection of which businesses received the tax credit. 
To conduct our analysis, we use data from the Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) MarketPlace 
files from the second quarter of 2002, 2004, and 2006.  We focus on tracts located in MSAs, as 
existing research has shown that there are fundamental differences between urban and rural 
development (Stephens & Partridge, 2011; Rupasingha & Goetz, 2013; Stephens, Partridge, & 
Faggian, 2013).6  In addition, approximately 91% of the projects that received the tax credit went 
to tracts in MSAs (Abravanel et al., 2013). The D&B data contains a wealth of information on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We will discuss in detail the specifics of the NMTC program and the eligibility for the program later in the paper.    
6 Rural areas may lack the economies of scale associated with agglomeration and thus business owners may not fully 
capture the same benefits that they would have in urban areas (Stephens & Partridge, 2011; Rupasingha & Goetz, 
2013; Stephens, Partridge, & Faggian, 2013).  Also, while eligibility for the NMTC is primarily based on the median 
income of a tract, rural areas can qualify under additional criteria that were added in 2004.  Specifically, rural tracts 
can be eligible for the credit if there is high out-migration or if there have been significant population declines. 
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establishments at the ZIP code level, including the SIC code of each business.7  In addition, the 
D&B data has information on how long each business has been open.  Throughout the paper, we 
define a new business as an establishment that has been open for less than one year and an 
existing business as an establishment that has been open for four or more years.8 
When we estimate the effect of the NMTC on businesses across all MSA census tracts, 
we find that businesses are less likely to locate in those tracts that are eligible to receive the tax 
credit.  However, businesses are generally more likely to prefer to locate in areas with lower 
poverty rates and higher incomes, and these areas are not eligible for the NMTC.  These higher 
income tracts that are ineligible for the program are likely to have unobservable attributes that 
are substantially different from those low-income tracts that are eligible for the tax credit.  To 
address this issue, we restrict the sample to those census tracts that are just above and just below 
the 0.80 income eligibility ratio.  We focus first on those tracts that have an income eligibility 
ratio between 0.70 and 0.90, and then further restrict the sample to those with an eligibility ratio 
between 0.75 and 0.85.9  Overall, we find that when we consider only those tracts near this 0.80 
eligibility ratio, there is an increase in both new businesses and new business employment in the 
tracts that are eligible for the NMTC.     
As mentioned earlier, the NMTC is a capital tax credit, so it is possible that the credit will 
have heterogenous effects across industries.  More specifically, the NMTC was allocated to firms 
primarily for capital expenditures, such as real estate and building space (Abravanel et al., 2013).  
When we stratify our results by industry, we find the effects on new employment seem to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 When a business is classified under more than one SIC code in the Dun and Bradstreet data, we classify the 
establishment according to its primary industry code. 
8 We choose four years as 45% of businesses fail in the first eighteen months (BLS, 2015).  This allows us to 
measure what we consider to be established firms, as we believe this is a strong indicators of growth and economic 
well-being of the area.  
9 We have run models further restricting the sample to be those tracts within 0.79 and 0.81 of the income eligibility 
ratio.  Those coefficients are similar to those presented below, but due to the decreased sample size tend to have 
larger standard errors.  These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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most concentrated in services and FIRE.  Given that FIRE includes real estate firms, this result is 
expected as one of the largest expenditures of the program was real estate investments.  The 
services industry includes a variety of sub-industries, including educational and social services, 
which are also two of the main areas that the tax credit was allocated towards (Abravanel et al., 
2013).  However, when we look at the effect on new establishments, we find strong evidence of a 
positive effect on the number of new establishments across all industries, except construction and 
transportation.  This finding of a positive effect on the number of establishments but limited 
effects on employment is consistent with the work of McCulloch and Yellen (1977) which 
argues that capital tax credits create a substitution away from low-skilled labor towards capital 
investment.  Our results are consistent with the prediction that programs such as the NMTC that 
are aimed at helping lagging areas may have some perverse effects as the policy may incentivize 
firms to reduce the number of low-skilled workers employed. 
We also consider the impact of the policy on existing firms.  When we look at existing 
firms, we see no effect of the policy on the level of employment in existing firms.  However, 
when we look across industries we find an increase in employment in existing construction 
firms, retail, and FIRE.  This result suggests that construction firms had to hire more workers to 
take on the additional projects created by the tax credit.  The positive effect on retail and FIRE 
suggests that these industries may have expanded to account for the increased number of firms 
and employees in the area.  Overall, our finding supports previous work that has found that the 
impact of government programs varies based on whether the policy favors investment in capital 
or labor (Hanson & Rohlin, 2011b; McCulloch & Yellen, 1977; Patrick, 2014).     
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2.2 describes in detail the specifics 
details of the NMTC program.  Existing research on place-based tax programs and the NMTC in 
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particular are discussed in Section 2.3.  Our empirical strategy is outlined in Section 2.4 and in 
Section 2.5 we discuss our data.  Section 2.6 contains our results.  We conclude and discuss 
policy implications in Section 2.7. 
 
2.2  The New Markets Tax Credit10 
 
The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 first established the NMTC program, and the 
tax credit has been renewed every year since implementation.  While the program was 
established in 2000, the first tax credits were not allocated until 2003 (Freedman, 2012; 
Abravanel et al., 2013).11  The goal of the NMTC program was to combine government and 
private funds to increase investment in low-income communities by $15 billion over the next 
five years (Groves, 2006; Rubin & Stankiewicz, 2005).   Although the NMTC program is similar 
to other location-based tax incentives, it is somewhat unique in that it aims to increase 
investment in eligible communities by using tax credits to mitigate some of the risk of opening a 
business in a low-income area. However, the tax credit is not large enough to remove all risk and 
is likely to avoid overinvestment (Freedman 2012).   
The NMTC is managed by a division of the U.S. Treasury department known as the 
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund.12  The goal of the CDFI fund is to 
increase community development and economic opportunities for distressed areas within the 
United States.  Since the inception of the NMTC, the CDFI fund has awarded roughly $36.5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The information from this section, unless otherwise cited, comes from resources found at www.cdfifund.gov. 
 
11 Applications were accepted for the first year of the program beginning in July 2002.  See 
http://www.cdfifund.gov/docs/2002_NMTC_NOAA.pdf for more information on when applications became 
available and when the applications were accepted. 
12 For more detailed information of the CDFI Fund please see http://www.cdfifund.gov/who_we_are/about_us.asp. 
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billion in tax credits through the program.13  Table 2.1 provides information on the total amount 
allocated through the NMTC program from 2001 to 2012.    
 
Table 2.1: Total NMTC Allocations  
Year Total Allocation 
2001-2002 $2,485,699,042.00 
2003-2004 $3,493,786,205.00 
2005 $1,964,830,000.00 
2006 $4,099,765,000.00 
2007 $3,893,000,000.00 
2008 $4,965,000,000.00 
2009 $5,000,000,000.00 
2010 $3,475,000,000.00 
2011 $3,622,919,753.00 
2012 $3,500,000,000.00 
Notes: The information on the allocations was obtained from the CDFI website, 
http://www.cdfifund.gov/docs/nmtc/2014/NMTCQEI_Report_042014.pdf. During the first two years of 
the program, although Congress provided allocations to the program, no allocations were to CDEs until 
2003 as start-up tasks delayed the process.  The allocations awarded to the NMTC program by Congress 
in 2001 and 2002 were combined and awarded by the CDFI fund to CDEs in 2003.  The allocations 
awarded to the NMTC program in 2003 and 2004 were then combined and dispersed to CDEs in 2004.  
See http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07296.pdf for more information on the allocations awarded. 
 
 
While firms could receive the NMTC for various types of investment, in practice the 
majority of the funds went towards capital investments.  The tax credit could be used for labor 
expenses, typically referred to as “business purposes,” but this type of expenditure was 
infrequent.  The tax credit was allocated over seven years, and to renew the credit certain criteria 
had to be verified each year.  Given the yearly requirements that firms had to meet to keep the 
tax credit, as well as the abundance of other tax credits available for labor purposes, most of the 
funds allocated through the NMTC went towards capital expenditures.  According to Abravanel 
et al. (2013), 46% of the projects funded by the NMTC were used for office, retail, mixed use, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Specific statistics on the allocation amounts of the tax credit were taken from the CDFI Fund’s website, 
www.cdfifund.gov. 
17 
 
hotel development.  The remaining projects were split up as follows: 22% to social services, 
educational, or cultural/arts use, 18% to manufacturing, industrial, or agricultural uses, 9% to 
health facilities, and 5% to housing.  This breakdown of the expenditures of the program further 
demonstrates that the tax credit allocations went towards more capital intensive projects. 
The CDFI administers tax credit allocations to qualified Community Development 
Entities (CDEs) which then disperse the funds to private investors in targeted areas (Freedman 
2012, Abravanel et al. 2013, Freedman 2013).14  CDEs consist of domestic corporations or 
partnerships that serve as intermediaries between investors and Low-Income Communities 
(LICs).  In order to qualify as a CDE, a corporation or partnership must apply for certification 
through the U.S. Treasury’s CDFI fund.15  Only businesses listed as corporations or partnerships 
for federal tax purposes are eligible for CDE certification.16  Once certified as a CDE by the 
CDFI Fund, the certification remains valid for the lifetime of the business provided it continues 
to comply with specific requirements.  The certification requirements detail only what is required 
to qualify as a CDE.  Additional requirements and reports may be obligatory to receive the tax 
credit allocations depending on the type and amount of investment a CDE receives.   
To meet the requirements for certification by the CDFI fund, the primary focus of a CDE 
must be to increase the amount of investment available to LICs.  More specifically, at least 60 
percent of the firm’s financial activity must be directed towards aiding LICs.17  In addition, 
qualification as a CDE is contingent upon community-resident representation on any advisory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The process by which a CDE determines which investors will receive investment funds may vary widely across 
CDEs.  It is possible that in some areas CDEs do not receive many applications and thus have very relaxed standards 
processes and in other areas the application process may be more competitive.  Without more information about 
individual CDEs and the constraints under which they operate, it is impossible to disentangle these differences.   
15 For more information on the CDE certification process, please reference the CDE certification application found 
at http://www.cdfifund.gov/docs/certification/CDE/CDE%20Certification%20Application_01222013.pdf  
16 Limited liability companies and sole proprietorships are not eligible for CDE status.  Government entities listed as 
partnerships or corporations for Federal income tax purposes are eligible to apply for CDE certification.   
17 See http://www.cdfifund.gov/docs/certification/CDE/CDEcertificationFAQs.pdf for more information on the rules 
regarding the allocation of tax credits. 
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board within the organization (Freedman 2012). The purpose of the advisory board requirement 
is to ensure accountability to the residents of the LICs.  CDEs accept qualified investments for 
use in low-income communities from private investors and in turn supply those investors with 
the tax credit.  If awarded a NMTC allocation, individual investors receive a federal income tax 
credit totaling 39% of the initial investment over seven years.  
 When the NMTC program was initially created, a census tract could qualify as a LIC if it 
met one of two criteria.  The first criterion is based on the median income of the tract.  Non-
MSA census tracts are eligible for LIC designation if the ratio of the census tract median family 
income (MFI) to state MFI is less than or equal to 80%.  Census tracts located within an MSA 
qualify for LIC status if the ratio of the tract MFI to the larger of the state or MSA MFI, is less 
than or equal to 80%.  Census tracts can also qualify based on the poverty rate, where tracts with 
poverty rates of 20% or higher are designated as LICs.   
In 2004, a revision was made to the NMTC program that added two additional 
qualification criteria – the low-population criterion and the out-migration criterion.  A tract 
qualifies on the low-population criterion if it contains fewer than 2,000 people, is located within 
an empowerment zone, and is contiguous to at least one other LIC (Freedman, 2012; Abravanel 
et al., 2013).  A tract qualifies on the migration criterion if it is located in a rural county with 
high out-migration, where high out-migration is defined as a net out-migration from the county 
of at least 10% of the county’s population at the beginning of the census from twenty years ago 
to the most recent census.18 This change allowed CDEs to invest in businesses that are not 
located in LICs if these businesses serve other targeted populations.19  Of all the tracts that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For a list of census tracts which qualify on the out-migration criteria please see 
http://www.cdfifund.gov/what_we_do/resources/ListofQualifyingNMTCCensusTractswithinHighMigrationRuralCo
untiesMay12012.pdf  
19 See www.cdfifund.gov for more information on the different targeted populations.  
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qualified as LICs, approximately 98% qualify on the income or poverty criteria, and the 
remaining 2% qualify as either low-population or high out-migration tracts (Freedman, 2012). 
 
Previous Research 
Local Economic Development Policy and Business Location 
State and local policy makers strive to attract new businesses, as these establishments are crucial 
drivers of growth for the U.S. economy.  In 2005, approximately 3.5 million new jobs were 
created by new businesses, dramatically more than any other firm-age category (Haltiwanger et 
al., 2013).  In order to help lagging areas, policy makers at all levels of government enact 
legislation that incentivizes new businesses to open in these struggling areas.  This idea, known 
as “economic gardening,” is emphasized by Neumark et al. (2007) who stated that “new firms 
contribute substantially to job creation.”20    
 However, there are questions regarding the best way to set up incentives to attract new 
businesses to an area.  Some argue that location-based programs are the optimal policy to 
incentivize businesses to locate in a specific area.  Glaeser (2001) argues that attracting new 
businesses to an area will generate economic surplus for current residents in the targeted area.  
Furthermore, he suggests that offering location-based tax incentives may be justified as the 
incentives compensate new businesses for future tax payments that will be made to the locality.  
This research is likely to be one of the reasons why policy makers offer location based tax 
incentives to attract new establishments to a specific jurisdiction. 
 Numerous papers have looked at the impact of various types of government policy on 
business location decisions.  Kolko and Neumark (2008) use the National Establishment Time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 There is an extensive literature estimating the effect and presence of agglomeration economics and the benefits to 
businesses of locating in areas with a large amount of economic activity (Arzaghi & Henderson, 2008; Duranton & 
Puga, 2004; Puga, 2010; Rosenthal & Strange, 2003; and Rosenthal & Strange, 2005).  
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Series (NETS) database to track the movement of both businesses and employment into and out 
of California as a result of differences in state policy. Other researchers have used establishment 
level data to determine the impact of state tax policy on business location (Gabe & Bell, 2004; 
Rathelot & Sillard, 2008; Duranton, Gobillon, & Overman, 2011; Bruce & Deskins, 2012; 
Rohlin, Rosenthal, & Ross, 2014).  Patrick (2014) created an index to capture the degree to 
which state constitutions are constructed in a manner that allows state governments to offer non-
tax incentives to attract new businesses.21    
Sectorial Variation in Business Location 
While an extensive literature has examined the relationship between firm location and local 
economic policy, it is possible that the effect of different programs varies based on the specifics 
of the policy and the industry of the business.  This relationship was formalized by Hanson and 
Rohlin (2011b) who examined the impact of Enterprise Zones (EZ) on where businesses located 
based on the industry of the establishment.  The EZ program is a tax credit given to businesses to 
locate in struggling areas and to hire workers from that area, causing the program to be a tax 
credit on labor.  Hanson and Rohlin (2011b) developed a theoretical model that showed that 
more labor intensive industries, such as retail and services, will be willing to bid more for land to 
locate in those areas that qualify for the EZ tax credit than more capital intensive industries, such 
as manufacturing.  The results of their analysis support this theoretical model, and suggest that 
there are differential effects of the policy based on how capital or labor intensive the industry is. 
22    
 In this paper, we focus on a capital tax credit, which may not have quite the same effects 
on employment across different industries as a labor tax credit.  An implication of a capital tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For a recent review of the methods used in this literature, see Arauzo-Carod et al. (2010). 
22 Patrick (2014) looked at the impact of capital subsidies, versus tax credits, and found that effects of the subsidies 
varied across industries in the expected manner based on the predictions of Hanson and Rohlin (2011b). 
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credit is that by reducing the price of capital, we have changed the price of capital relative to 
labor. Therefore, it is possible that these investments in capital improvements may come at the 
expense of unskilled labor, which tends to be highly substitutable with capital.  This theory of the 
substitutability of capital and unskilled labor in response to capital subsidies was formalized by 
McCulloch and Yellen (1977).  Their model suggests that when tax or subsidy programs cheapen 
the cost of capital, firms may respond by improving capital at the expense of workers. Therefore, 
it is important to consider the effect of a capital tax credit across industries to see which of these 
two possible mechanisms is present and dominant. 
 
New Markets Tax Credit 
First implemented in 2001, the NMTC has been renewed every year since it was enacted by 
Congress.  Despite the longevity of this program, little research exists examining the impacts of 
the NMTC.  Gurley-Calvez et al. (2009) analyzed whether there was an increase in new 
investment as a result of the NMTC or if investors simply reallocated investments intended for a 
non-qualifying tract into a qualifying tract.  The authors use an instrumental variables approach 
to determine the effect of the policy and find that some new investments come from individual 
filers.  However, they find that corporate filings, which comprise most of the NMTC recipients 
in their sample, are unlikely to represent new investment.23     
 Freedman (2012) examined the impact of the NMTC on the communities that received 
tax credit allocations.  To address the endogenous selection process, he uses the income 
eligibility criteria and an instrumental variables approach to determine whether the NMTC 
program caused improvements in the LICs to which the credit was allocated.  Using census tract 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Rubin & Stankiewicz (2009) and Hicks & Faulk (2012) also provide evidence that the NMTC created investment 
in areas that were eligible for the credit.  However, their analysis did not address the endogenous selection of which 
investments receive the tax credit. 
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level data to examine several neighborhood outcomes, he finds that the NMTC program had 
some positive impacts on eligible communities, such as reductions in the unemployment and 
poverty rates.  
Freedman (2013) explores another possible avenue through which the NMTC could 
impact local jurisdictions – regional labor markets.  Exploiting the same discontinuity in the 
income eligibility criteria, combined with data from the CDFI Fund and employment data from 
OnTheMap, Freedman (2013) examines whether NMTC eligibility affects the distribution of 
employment across residents of LICs.  His results suggest that to the extent to which new jobs 
are created in these targeted communities, few go to residents of the eligible low-income 
communities.  However, the findings do not account for the possibility of improvements in LICs 
as a result of the new investment through mechanisms other than direct employment effects.  
 We contribute to this growing literature and test whether or not the NMTC attracts new 
businesses and employment to LICs.  In addition, we examine whether the program has industry-
specific effects, given that the NMTC is a capital investment tax credit and might have a 
heterogenous effect across different types of businesses.  
 
2.3  Empirical Strategy 
 
When estimating the effect of the NMTC on business location decisions, there are two selection 
processes that must be considered.  First, businesses select locations based on various local 
attributes, many of which are unobservable.  Second, not all applicants received the tax credit, so 
simply comparing those that received the credit to those that did not is problematic as businesses 
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are likely to select locations based on their growth potential.24  To address these concerns, we 
draw upon a plausibly exogenous eligibility cutoff that determines whether or not a census tract 
is eligible to receive the NMTC.  We do not consider whether or not a specific business received 
the tax credit, we only consider if more businesses locate in eligible versus ineligible tracts.  
Given that the goal of the program is for the NMTC to drive continual growth, the overall effect 
on new business activity is important to consider. 
 As described above, to be eligible to receive the NMTC, the ratio of the median income 
in a given census tract to the state median income must be less than 0.80.25  We draw upon this 
plausibly exogenous cut-off in eligibility for the tax credit and compare activity in tracts that 
were eligible to those that were ineligible.  Using data on whether or not a census tract is eligible 
for the tax credit, we initially run the following regression across all MSA census tracts: 
 𝑦!"! − 𝑦!"! = 𝛽!𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔! + 𝛽! 𝑋!!""" + 𝑓(𝑚)+ 𝛾! + 𝛿! + 𝜀!". 
 
Where i indicates a census tract, j indicates the two-digit SIC code, 2 designates the year 
following the enactment of the NMTC, which may be 2004 or 2006, and 1 designates 2002. 𝑦!"! − 𝑦!"! is the difference over time within a given census tract in the number of new business 
activity in a given industry, and 𝑋!!""" is a set of controls for other socio-economic attributes of 
the tract, including percent black, percent Hispanic, average age, average income, education 
measures, and percent female.  Note that when considering new business activity, we look at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Note that we do not have data on whether or not a specific firm received the tax credit.  All we know is whether or 
not the area is eligible for the tax credit.  This means that there are two effects possible – the direct of effect of those 
firms that receive the tax credit and the indirect effect of the new firms receiving the tax credit attracting other firms 
to the area.  Given the nature of our data, we are unable to separate out these two effects. 
25 For tracts located in MSAs, eligibility is established based on the state median income or the MSA median 
income, whichever is higher.  We account for this distinction in our analysis but for ease of discussion only mention 
the state median income in the text. 
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both the effect on the number of new establishments, as well as employment at these new 
establishments.  We also include industry fixed effects, 𝛾!, at the two-digit SIC code and state 
fixed effects, 𝛿!.  Our variable of interest is 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔!, which indicates whether or not a specific 
census tract is eligible for the NMTC.  𝑓(𝑚) is a control function which allows for the 
relationship between the MFI and new businesses to be non-linear.26  We have experimented 
with multiple specifications of this control function, and the linear relationship was shown to be 
the best fit.27  𝜀!" is an idiosyncratic error term. 
When examining where businesses locate, there are likely to be unobservable attributes 
of the local jurisdiction that affect where a new enterprise opens (Puga, 2010; Rosenthal & 
Strange, 2003, 2005; Arzaghi & Henderson, 2008; Duranton & Puga, 2004).  For example, we 
cannot obtain data that controls for the local agglomeration economies that may benefit firms in 
the area. Therefore, when we run the above regression for the entire sample, there are likely to be 
unobservable local attributes that are correlated with business location decisions that may bias 
our estimates.   
To control for these unobservable variables, we draw upon a plausibly exogenous cutoff 
set by the government regarding eligibility for the NMTC program and compare census tracts 
that are just eligible for the tax credit to those that are just ineligible.  Using this boundary, we 
are able to compare similar areas and control for unobserved attributes of the locality.  Recall 
that for a tract to be eligible for the NMTC, the ratio of the median family income in the census 
tract to the state median family income has to be less than or equal to 0.80.  We draw upon this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Given the nature of our control function, we are assuming a sharp discontinuity in the treatment because we define 
treatment as being eligible for the tax credit.  This is consistent with our identification, as we do not know exactly 
which tracts receive the tax credit and rely only on the eligible or not eligible criteria as our treatment. 
27 Using the AIC criteria, we determined that the linear specification was the best fit for the regression.  We have 
experimented with higher order polynomials as well, and the results are consistent but are not shown in the interest 
of space.  These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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cutoff in the income eligibility criterion and compare census tracts with an eligibility ratio just 
above and just below 0.80, as these areas are likely to have similar unobservable 
characteristics.28  Initially, we restrict the sample to those tracts with a ratio between 0.70 and 
0.90 and then further restrict the sample to those tracts with a ratio between 0.75 and 0.85.29,30 
Our identifying assumption is that prior to the change in policy, there was no systematic 
difference in those tracts just above and just below the 0.80 income eligibility cutoff.  To justify 
this assumption, we need to show that there was nothing unique about the 0.80 cutoff prior to the 
policy change.  While the law was passed in 2000, applications did not start being accepted until 
July 2002 and funds were not allocated until 2003.  Therefore, we use the second quarter of 2002 
as our pre-period, as it is unlikely new businesses formed as a result of the tax credit since the 
announcement of the awards had not yet been released.31  Looking close to the 0.80 boundary in 
2002, we show in Figure 2.1a that there is nothing unique about this boundary, as the number of 
employees at new establishments appears to be continuous across the boundary.  In Figures 2.1b 
and 2.1c we look at this same portion of the income eligibility ratio in 2004 and 2006.  We see 
that in those years there is a clear jump in new employment at this boundary, suggesting that the 
policy had an effect on the relative attractiveness of one side of the boundary to the other.   
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Similar boundary type regressions have been used in other applications in the literature, such as Holmes (1998), 
Levitt (1998), and Black (1999). 
29 A tract can be eligible for the NMTC based on either the eligibility ratio or the poverty rate in the tract.  However, 
few tracts qualify based on the poverty criterion alone.  Freedman (2012) showed that approximately 70% of tracts 
that have a poverty rate between 15-20% qualify for the NMTC based on the income eligibility criterion.  Therefore, 
since the poverty rate criterion does not appear to be the determining factor for eligibility in the NMTC, we focus on 
the income eligibility criterion. 
30 Data on where the individual investments were made is not currently publically available.  It is possible to obtain 
information on the address of the CDEs, but we are unable to determine the tract where the investments were made. 
31 As a robustness check, we use 1994 as our pre-period later in the paper and the results are consistent. 
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Figure 2.1a: Average Number of New Employment in 2002 over the Eligibility Ratio 
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Figure 2.1b: Average Number of New Employment in 2004 over the Eligibility Ratio 
 
 
Figure 2.1c: Average Number of New Employment in 2006 over the Eligibility Ratio 
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To show that there is nothing systematic about this cutoff, we also look at pattern of the 
average age of a tract, percentage of the tract that is black, percentage of the tract that is 
Hispanic, and percentage of the tract without a high school diploma.  Figures 2.2a through 2.2d 
show these control variables, respectively, in 2000 across the eligibility ratio.  These figures 
show continuity across the eligibility ratio and suggest that something else going on at this 
boundary is not driving our results.32 
 
Figure 2.2a: Average Age in Census Tract in 2000 over the Eligibility Ratio 
 
 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Although there is a small jump when crossing the eligibility ratio in the percentage of the tract that is black, the 
jump after eligibility is an increase in the percentage black.  Typically, lower income areas tend to have higher 
percentage minority.  This increase in percentage black acts in the opposite direction of the NMTC and thus is 
unlikely to bias our results.   
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Figure 2.2b: Average Percent Black in Census Tract in 2000 over the Eligibility Ratio 
 
 
Figure 2.2c: Average Percent Hispanic in Census Tract in 2000 over the Eligibility Ratio 
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Figure 2.2d: Average Percent No High School Education in Census Tract in 2000 over Eligibility 
Ratio 
 
2.4  Data 
 
We use two primary data sets for our analysis.  First, we use 2000 Census data to control for the 
local attributes of each tract.  Because eligibility for the NMTC was determined in 2000, we use 
the 2000 decennial census to create our eligibility ratio.  Table 2.2a presents the year 2000 
summary statistics for tracts that were eligible to receive the NMTC as well as those that were 
ineligible.  As we can see, these two groups are substantially different across many observable 
characteristics.  Those tracts that are eligible for the tax credit tend to have significantly higher 
unemployment rates, higher percentage of the tract that is black and Hispanic, lower average 
income, and lower educational levels.  Therefore, looking at the entire sample of tracts that are 
eligible versus those that are not is likely to produce biased estimates, as there are likely to be 
unobservable attributes of the neighborhoods that may affect the decisions of business owners. 
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Table 2.2a: 2000 Census Tract Summary Statistics  
 Eligible Tracts Ineligible Tracts 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Percent Female 51.00% 0.060 51.00% 0.035 
Percent Black 26.97% 0.324 8.39% 0.157 
Percent Hispanic 18.87% 0.265 8.24% 0.131 
Average Age 34.47 5.581 37.00 4.671 
Percent Some HS 20.31% 0.078 10.51% 0.059 
Percent HS Graduate 33.06% 0.098 29.97% 0.112 
Percent Some College 19.49% 0.073 23.44% 0.064 
Percent College Graduate 12.68% 0.104 30.38% 0.182 
Tract Average Income 39,547 9,354 73,149 3,329 
Percent Unemployed 10.60% 0.079 4.57% 0.035 
 
  
To address this concern regarding unobservable local attributes, we utilize a regression 
discontinuity research design.  We compare tracts that are just above the 0.80 income eligibility 
ratio to those that are just below the cutoff.  In Table 2.2b, we compare those tracts that have a 
ratio of 0.70 to 0.80 and those tracts with a ratio of 0.80 to 0.90.  As shown in this table, these 
tracts are more similar in terms of the observable attributes than the full sample, suggesting that 
by focusing on tracts near the income eligibility ratio boundary, we are better able to control for 
unobserved local attributes. 
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Table 2.2b: 2000 Census Tract Summary Statistics by ER Range 
 Ratio between 0.70 and 0.80 Ratio between 0.80 and 0.90 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Percent Female 50.90% 0.041 50.97% 0.034 
Percent Black 16.66% 0.247 11.20% 0.191 
Percent Hispanic 12.87% 0.207 12.27% 0.187 
Average Age 36.20 4.848 36.82 4.647 
Percent Some HS 17.17% 0.059 15.01% 0.053 
Percent HS Graduate 36.06% 0.091 35.97% 0.091 
Percent Some College 21.29% 0.066 22.35% 0.062 
Percent College Graduate 14.49% 0.091 17.38% 0.099 
Tract Average Income 45,245 7,214 51,104 8,027 
Percent Unemployed 7.42% 0.042 6.18% 0.037 
     
 
The second data set used is the Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) Marketplace files for the 
second quarter of 2002, 2004, and 2006.33  This data is collected by Dun and Bradstreet and was 
obtained aggregated to the ZIP code level.  We convert the ZIP code level data to year 2000 
census tract geography using GIS software.34  We transform the D&B data to the tract level 
because census tract median income is the criteria used to determine eligibility for the NMTC 
program.35  The D&B data contains a wealth of information on businesses.  This includes 
detailed information on the industry to which each establishment belongs (based on the 
establishment’s Standard Industrial Code), the number of employees, how long the business has 
been in operation, and sales information.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The D&B data includes nearly all establishments apart from part-time schedule-C filers.  The data have been used 
in a number of studies including Rosenthal and Strange (2001, 2003, 2005) and Rosenthal and Ross (2010).  Kolko 
and Neumark (2010) and Kolko (2012) use a panel version of the data, the National Establishment Time-Series 
(NETS), that was jointly developed by Don Walls and Dun and Bradstreet. 
34 To make such a conversion, we assume that the businesses within a ZIP code are uniformly distributed throughout 
the area.  Note that in MSAs, only 40 percent of tracts overlap more than one ZIP code. 
35 One concern with this correspondence is that we are creating measurement error by assuming that business 
activity is distributed uniformly throughout the ZIP code.  Based on the distribution of businesses near the cutoff, 
which are the focus of our analysis, and simulations based on where in the narrow band widths these tracts that cross 
multiple ZIP codes are located, any bias from this assumption would bias our results towards zero.  This suggests 
that the estimates provided are a lower bound of the effect of the policy.  For further information on the distribution 
of activity across ZIP codes and census tracts, please contact the authors. 
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Table 2.3a provides summary statistics of new and existing business activity in 2002 in 
all eligible tracts versus all ineligible tracts.  The first two rows contain the mean and standard 
deviation for businesses in all industries, then we stratify the new and existing businesses by 
industry type – construction, manufacturing, transportation wholesale, retail, FIRE (financial, 
insurance, real estate), and services.  As we can see, the tracts that are not eligible for the NMTC 
have more business activity in general than those that are eligible across all industries, as well as 
for each specific industry.   
 
Table 2.3a: 2002 Business Summary Statistics 
 Eligible Tracts Ineligible Tracts 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
All New Businesses 2.696 5.337 5.2611 7.032 
All Existing Businesses 126.484 237.100 217.290 253.26 
New Construction 0.276 0.620 0.615 1.013 
Existing Construction 9.762 20.315 21.332 26.697 
New Manufacturing 0.179 0.550 0.346 0.618 
Existing Manufacturing 7.286 19.867 12.236 19.609 
New Transportation 0.122 0.348 0.207 0.409 
Existing Transportation 4.513 10.654 6.926 10.301 
New Wholesale  0.153 0.539 0.270 0.554 
Exiting Wholesale 7.752 26.676 12.454 22.616 
New Retail 0.648 1.085 1.103 1.475 
Existing Retail 27.851 38.889 43.455 45.584 
New FIRE 0.168 0.472 0.386 0.702 
Existing FIRE 10.850 27.825 20.459 29.641 
New Services 1.091 2.383 2.200 2.132 
Existing Services 56.630 105.411 96.070 113.977 
 
Just like with Table 2.2b, in Table 2.3b we restrict our sample to those tracts with an 
income eligibility ratio between 0.70 and 0.90.  When we restrict our sample to just those tracts 
that are slightly above the income eligibility cutoff to those that are slightly below the cutoff, we 
see that these tracts are more similar regarding the number of new and existing businesses prior 
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to the allocation of the NMTC.  The pattern is consistent when we consider all industries, as well 
as when we focus on each industry separately.   
 
Table 2.3b: 2002 Business Summary Statistics by ER Range 
 Ratio between 0.70 and 0.80 Ratio between 0.80 and 0.90 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
All New Businesses 3.135 5.113 3.710 5.098 
All Existing Businesses 145.104 190.498 170.422 187.841 
New Construction 0.371 0.701 0.452 0.829 
Existing Construction 13.102 17.845 16.552 20.053 
New Manufacturing 0.212 0.521 0.252 0.475 
Existing Manufacturing 8.521 15.651 9.943 13.865 
New Transportation 0.149 0.371 0.168 0.343 
Existing Transportation 5.363 10.306 6.062 8.018 
New Wholesale  0.169 0.555 0.184 0.433 
Exiting Wholesale 8.508 22.372 9.491 15.826 
New Retail 0.750 1.069 0.886 1.226 
Existing Retail 32.307 35.107 37.830 40.066 
New FIRE 0.183 0.417 0.219 0.448 
Existing FIRE 12.260 20.405 14.552 18.756 
New Services 1.221 2.332 1.448 2.113 
Existing Services 62.388 81.489 72.630 90.947 
 
 
Overall, the summary statistics in Tables 2.2a and 2.3a suggest that comparing all eligible 
tracts to all ineligible tracts is likely to be confounded by unobservable attributes.  When we 
restrict our sample to those tracts just above and just below the eligibility ratio, as we do in 
Tables 2.2b and 2.3b, we have a set of census tracts that are similar in terms of observable 
attributes and are more likely to be more comparable to one another. 
 
2.5  Results 
 
Impact of the NMTC on New Employment and Businesses 
We begin by looking at the impact of eligibility for the NMTC on new business activity.  
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Throughout this discussion, we define a new business as an establishment that has been open for 
less than one year.  As mentioned earlier, we do not have information on whether or not a 
specific business received the tax credit.  Therefore, we only use whether or not a tract is eligible 
for the NMTC as exogenous variation in where new businesses locate.  While the decision of 
which investment projects receive the tax credit is subject to a political process that may be 
endogenous, eligibility for the NMTC, which is based on census tract characteristics, is likely to 
be exogenous to the selection procedure.   
 We first consider all census tracts located within MSAs in the United States.  Results 
using the change in new employment as the dependent variable are presented in Table 2.4a, 
while the results using new firms as the dependent variable are in Table 2.4b.36  Panel A contains 
the results using 2004 as the post policy change period, the year immediately after the NMTC 
allocations were first distributed.  Panel B provides estimates of the effect of the policy change 
over a longer period, looking at the change from 2002 to 2006.  Standard errors are clustered at 
the MSA level and are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient.  All models include 
neighborhood controls, as well as fixed effects for the two-digit SIC code and state.37 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 All models have been run without controls, since the assumption of the regression discontinuity is that observable 
attributes should not affect our results.  Results from that analysis are consistent with those reported in the paper but 
are not presented in the interest of space.   
37 The neighborhood attributes included as controls are percent female, percent black, percent Hispanic, average age, 
measures of educational attainment, average income, unemployment rate, and the percent of households that have a 
female head of household and children.  All of these variables are at the 2000 census tract level. 
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Table 2.4a: Effect of New Market Tax Credit Qualification Status on the Change in 
New Employment in Census Tracts in MSAs  
 
Entire Sample 
Eligibility Ratio 
0.70 to 0.90 
Eligibility Ratio 
0.75 to 0.85 
Panel A: 2002 Q2 to 2004 Q2 
NMTC Qualified -0.021** 0.051*** 0.013 
Census Tract (0.008) (0.018) (0.030) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,871,385 898,157 443,444 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.002 
    
Panel B: 2002 Q2 to 2006 Q2 
NMTC Qualified -0.057 0.041 0.066** 
Census Tract (0.045) (0.042) (0.033) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,874,040 899,042 443,916 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  Only tracts located within 
an MSA are included in this table.  State and industry fixed effects are included in 
the regressions.  Control variables include the percent of the population that is 
female, the percent of the population that is black, the percent of the population that 
is Hispanic, the average age of the population, the percent of the population without 
a high school diploma, the percent of the population with some college, the percent 
of the population with a college degree, the average income, the unemployment rate, 
and the percent of female headed households with children within the tract. 
 
 
When we consider all census tracts located within an MSA, we find a negative and 
statistically significant effect of the NMTC on the number of new businesses and new 
employment, suggesting that the tax incentive deters businesses from locating in eligible areas.  
However, as mentioned earlier there are issues regarding unobservable differences between high-
37 
 
income and low-income tracts that are likely to bias the estimates.  To address these concerns, 
we restrict the sample to those tracts located in an MSA that are close to the income eligibility 
ratio, specifically those with an income eligibility ratio between 0.70 and 0.90 and 0.75 and 0.85.   
When we restrict the sample to tracts near the income eligibility cutoff, we find evidence 
that the NMTC has a positive effect on the number of new firms and new employment in 2004 
and 2006.38  We see consistent positive effects of the policy on new employment, with a point 
estimate between 0.051 and 0.066 percentage points, though we only have statistical significance 
when the eligibility ratio is between 0.70 and 0.90 in 2004 and between 0.75 and 0.85 in 2006.  
Overall, our results suggest that the NMTC increased new employment in those areas close to the 
income eligibility ratio. 
Table 2.4b contains our results regarding the effect of the NMTC on the number of new 
firms in eligible tracts.  As was the case with employment, we find the negative effect for the 
entire sample, but this is not surprising given the likelihood that we have unobserved variables 
present when considering all tracts.  When we focus on those areas close to the boundary, we 
find positive and statistically significant increases in the number of new firms of between 0.007 
and 0.009 percentage points within 0.70 and 0.90 of the income eligibility ratio.  However, when 
we look closer to the cutoff at 0.75 to 0.85, we have similar coefficients but the standard errors 
have increased so we no longer obtain statistically significant effects.  Overall, our findings 
suggest that the policy had a positive impact on those census tracts that are close to the 0.80 
income eligibility ratio cutoff.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 One concern is that the 2000 decade had a decline in business activity, followed by a period of growth, which then 
turned into a recession late in the decade.  Given our identification strategy, we are comparing tracts that are eligible 
for the tax credit to those that are not eligible for the tax credit in a given year.  Therefore, as long as any shocks to 
the economy affect the tracts in our sample in a similar manner, then business cycle trends will not bias our 
estimates.  While this is likely to be a concern when looking at all census tracts, it is less likely this is driving our 
results when we are comparing those tracts that are just eligible to those that are just ineligible. 
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Table 2.4b: Effect of New Market Tax Credit Qualification Status on the Change in 
New Firms in Census Tracts in MSAs  
 
Entire Sample 
Eligibility Ratio 
0.70 to 0.90 
Eligibility Ratio 
0.75 to 0.85 
Panel A: 2002 Q2 to 2004 Q2 
NMTC Qualified -0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007 
Census Tract (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,871,385 898,157 443,444 
R-squared 0.095 0.059 0.063 
    
Panel B: 2002 Q2 to 2006 Q2 
NMTC Qualified -0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008 
Census Tract (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,874,040 899,042 443,916 
R-squared 0.101 0.078 0.085 
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level and are reported in parentheses.  ***, 
**, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  Only tracts located within 
an MSA are included in this table.  State and industry fixed effects are included in the 
regressions.  Control variables include the percent of the population that is female, the 
percent of the population that is black, the percent of the population that is Hispanic, 
the average age of the population, the percent of the population without a high school 
diploma, the percent of the population with some college, the percent of the 
population with a college degree, the average income, the unemployment rate, and the 
percent of female headed households with children within the tract. 
 
 
Impact of the NMTC by Industry  
Next, we consider how the effect of the tax credit varies across different industries.  As noted 
above, the NMTC was used primarily for capital investments, such as office renovations and real 
estate.  As shown previously by Hanson and Rohlin (2013) and Patrick (2014), taxes and 
subsidies do not necessarily have the same effect across all industries.  In addition, McCulloch 
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and Yellen (1977) suggest that capital tax credits may have perverse labor market effects, as the 
programs may incentivize firms to replace low-skilled workers with capital that has now become 
relatively less expensive.  Therefore, we look next at how the effect of the policy varies both 
across new employment and firm openings across industries. 
 Looking first at the effect on employment at new firms located in census tracts with an 
eligibility ratio between 0.70 and 0.90 in Table 2.5a, we find positive and statistically significant 
employment effects in both 2004 and 2006 for FIRE and services.  The magnitude of this 
increase is approximately 0.04 percentage points for FIRE and 0.13 percentage points for 
services.  Given that a large portion of the funds allocated through the NMTC went towards 
office space and real estate, the positive effect on FIRE is expected.39  In addition, services 
includes educational and social services.  As mentioned earlier, this is one of the primary areas 
that the NMTC was allocated towards, so this positive effect is consistent with how the tax credit 
allocations were used.  When we look at areas within 0.75 and 0.85 of the eligibility ratio in 
Table 2.5b, we still find a positive effect of a similar magnitude of the NMTC on employment in 
services and FIRE.  These results indicate that the overall positive effect we find on employment 
seems to be driven primarily by FIRE and services. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Note that the “real estate” in FIRE references real estate firms.  We would expect that if investment in real estate 
increased, that there would be positive effects on these types of businesses.  However, it should be noted that this 
does not necessarily mean that is where the real estate investment took place.  For example, a manufacturing firm 
could use the tax credit to buy additional land to expand their operations, but this type of investment would directly 
affect manufacturing firms. 
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Table 2.5a: Effect of New Market Tax Credit Qualification Status on the Change in New 
Employment in a Census Tract with an Eligibility Ratio between 0.70 and 0.90 Classified by 
Industry.  
 Constr Manufact Transport Wholesale Retail FIRE Services 
Panel A: 2002 Q2 to 2004 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 0.108* 0.005 0.017 0.065 0.045** 0.035* 0.128*** 
Census Tract (0.061) (0.022) (0.034) (0.044) (0.017) (0.019) (0.045) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,669 304,460 60,892 30,446 121,784 106,561 213,122 
R-squared 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 
        
Panel B: 2002 Q2 to 2006 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 0.044 -0.014 0.026 -0.006 0.023 0.038* 0.140* 
Census Tract (0.034) (0.107) (0.016) (0.066) (0.015) (0.023) (0.071) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,714 304,760 60,952 30,476 121,904 106,666 213,332 
R-squared 0.021 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  Eligibility ratio cutoff of 0.70 to 0.90 included 
in all columns in this table.  State and industry fixed effects are included in the regressions.  
Control variables include the percent of the population that is female, the percent of the 
population that is black, the percent of the population that is Hispanic, the average age of the 
population, the percent of the population without a high school diploma, the percent of the 
population with some college, the percent of the population with a college degree, the average 
income, the unemployment rate, and the percent of female headed households with children 
within the tract. 
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Table 2.5b: Effect of New Market Tax Credit Qualification Status on the Change in New 
Employment in a Census Tract with an Eligibility Ratio between 0.75 and 0.85 Classified by 
Industry.  
 Constr Manufact Transport Wholesale Retail FIRE Services 
Panel A: 2002 Q2 to 2004 Q2 
NMTC Qualified -0.181 -0.033 -0.069 -0.111 0.068* 0.043 0.126* 
Census Tract (0.229) (0.055) (0.081) (0.166) (0.040) (0.040) (0.064) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,548 150,320 30,064 15,032 60,128 52,612 105,224 
R-squared 0.017 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.006 
        
Panel B: 2002 Q2 to 2006 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 0.027 0.045*** 0.002 0.105** 0.020 0.036** 0.159 
Census Tract (0.057) (0.015) (0.020) (0.047) (0.039) (0.014) (0.121) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,572 150,480 30,096 15,048 60,192 52,668 105,336 
R-squared 0.026 0.001 0.008 0.010 0.002 0.012 0.004 
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * 
denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  Eligibility ratio cutoff of 0.70 to 0.90 included 
in all columns in this table.  State and industry fixed effects are included in the regressions.  
Control variables include the percent of the population that is female, the percent of the 
population that is black, the percent of the population that is Hispanic, the average age of the 
population, the percent of the population without a high school diploma, the percent of the 
population with some college, the percent of the population with a college degree, the average 
income, the unemployment rate, and the percent of female headed households with children 
within the tract. 
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 Tables 2.6a and 2.6b follow the same structure as Tables 2.5a and 2.5b but use the change 
in the number of new firms as the dependent variable.  Across both years and distance bands, we 
find strong evidence that there is a positive effect of the NMTC on new firms in all industries 
except for construction and transportation. Combining these results with the employment results, 
this suggests that firms in manufacturing, wholesale, retail, FIRE, and services were able to use 
the funds towards capital investment.  However, we do not find an increase in the number of 
establishments leads to an increase in employment in manufacturing, wholesale, and retail.  This 
result is consistent with McCulloch and Yellen (1977) who argued that programs which adjust 
the relative price of capital and labor may have unintended consequences of causing firms to 
replace low-skilled workers with capital investments.   
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Table 2.6a: Effect of New Market Tax Credit Qualification Status on the Change in New Firms in a 
Census Tract with an Eligibility Ratio between 0.70 and 0.90 Classified by Industry.  
 Constr Manufact Transport Wholesale Retail FIRE Services 
Panel A: 2002 Q2 to 2004 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 0.012* 0.001** 0.001 0.011** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.015*** 
Census Tract (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,669 304,460 60,892 30,446 121,784 106,561 213,122 
R-squared 0.066 0.009 0.028 0.024 0.049 0.038 0.058 
        
Panel B: 2002 Q2 to 2006 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 0.011 0.002*** 0.006** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 
Census Tract (0.009) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,714 304,760 60,952 30,476 121,904 106,666 213,332 
R-squared 0.075 0.021 0.030 0.029 0.048 0.049 0.078 
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote 
p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  Eligibility ratio cutoff of 0.70 to 0.90 included in all 
columns in this table.  State and industry fixed effects are included in the regressions.  Control 
variables include the percent of the population that is female, the percent of the population that is 
black, the percent of the population that is Hispanic, the average age of the population, the percent of 
the population without a high school diploma, the percent of the population with some college, the 
percent of the population with a college degree, the average income, the unemployment rate, and the 
percent of female headed households with children within the tract. 
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Table 2.6b: Effect of New Market Tax Credit Qualification Status on the Change in NEW Firms in 
a Census Tract with an Eligibility Ratio between 0.75 and 0.85 Classified by Industry.  
 Constr Manufact Transport Wholesale Retail FIRE Services 
Panel A: 2002 Q2 to 2004 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 0.012 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.010* 0.004** 0.017* 
Census Tract (0.014) (0.001) (0.007) (0.017) (0.005) (0.002) (0.010) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,548 150,320 30,064 15,032 60,128 52,612 105,224 
R-squared 0.071 0.012 0.034 0.031 0.054 0.043 0.061 
        
Panel B: 2002 Q2 to 2006 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 0.017 0.003*** 0.003 0.014 0.016*** 0.004 0.011 
Census Tract (0.018) (0.001) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.015) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,572 150,480 30,096 15,048 60,192 52,668 105,336 
R-squared 0.081 0.023 0.040 0.034 0.052 0.055 0.085 
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  Eligibility ratio cutoff of 0.70 to 0.90 included in all 
columns in this table.  State and industry fixed effects are included in the regressions.  Control 
variables include the percent of the population that is female, the percent of the population that is 
black, the percent of the population that is Hispanic, the average age of the population, the percent 
of the population without a high school diploma, the percent of the population with some college, 
the percent of the population with a college degree, the average income, the unemployment rate, and 
the percent of female headed households with children within the tract. 
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Impact of the NMTC on Existing Employment 
Next, we examine the impact of the NMTC on existing employment.40  The goal of the NMTC 
was to incentivize investors to allocate more funds in lower income tracts.  The credits could be 
used for either new businesses or existing establishments, where we define an existing business 
as one that has been open for at least four years.41  Therefore, it is possible that the NMTC has an 
effect on existing businesses through increased capital investment in these establishments.42   
 In Table 2.7, we look at the effect of eligibility for the NMTC on existing employment.  
We see that when considering all census tracts located within MSAs, the effect of the policy is 
negative, but is not statistically significant.  When we focus on just those tracts close to the 
boundary, we find positive effects, but again we do not find that these effects are statistically 
significant.  This suggests that while the NMTC could have been used towards existing firms, it 
appears that the credit had the strongest effect on attracting new firms versus affecting the 
activities of existing establishments. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 We have also run all these regressions using the number of existing firms.  Since we are primarily interested in 
employment effects, we choose to only show these results to streamline the discussion.  	  
41 We consider existing firms to be those firms that have been open four or more years, given the high closure rate of 
young firms.  We believe this measure of existing firms captures established firms past the initial failure period.	  
42 Another mechanism through which the policy could affect existing businesses is if the tax credit created turnover 
with regards to existing firms (see Rohlin and Ross (2015) for more information on how policy may create business 
turnover versus net new businesses). 
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Table 2.7: Effect of New Market Tax Credit Qualification Status on the Change in 
Existing  Employment in Census Tracts in MSAs  
 
Entire Sample 
Eligibility Ratio 
0.70 to 0.90 
Eligibility Ratio 
0.75 to 0.85 
Panel A: 2002 Q2 to 2004 Q2 
NMTC Qualified -0.358 0.623 1.889 
Census Tract (0.418) (1.465) (1.447) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,948,429 911,834 450,477 
R-squared 0.017 0.010 0.015 
    
Panel B: 2002 Q2 to 2006 Q2 
NMTC Qualified -0.477 0.867 2.022 
Census Tract (0.408) (1.292) (1.376) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,948,429 911,834 450,477 
R-squared 0.015 0.009 0.012 
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level and are reported in parentheses.  ***, 
**, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  Only tracts located within 
an MSA are included in this table.  State and industry fixed effects are included in the 
regressions.  Control variables include the percent of the population that is female, the 
percent of the population that is black, the percent of the population that is Hispanic, 
the average age of the population, the percent of the population without a high school 
diploma, the percent of the population with some college, the percent of the 
population with a college degree, the average income, the unemployment rate, and the 
percent of female headed households with children within the tract. 
 
 In Tables 2.8a and 2.8b, we examine the effect of the tax credit by industry.  Looking 
across both tables, we find positive and statistically significant increases in employment in 
construction, retail, and FIRE.  The increase in existing employment in construction is consistent 
with the capital tax credit leading to new capital investments.  If the funds went to capital 
investments, then firms will likely need to undergo some form of construction, causing 
employment at construction firms to increase.  Retail and FIRE firms also experienced an 
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increase in employment.  One explanation for the effect on retail is that retail includes eating and 
drinking places.  Given the increases in employment, there will likely be higher demand for 
places to have lunch and dinner, causing expansions in employment at these firms.  The positive 
effect on FIRE would similarly be based on increased demand for the services offered by these 
establishments, especially those involved in real estate.   
 
Table 2.8a: Effect of New Market Tax Credit Qualification Status on the Change in Existing 
Employment in a Census Tract with an Eligibility Ratio between 0.70 and 0.90 Classified by 
Industry.  
 Constr Manufact Transport Wholesale Retail FIRE Services 
Panel A: 2002 Q2 to 2004 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 2.372** 0.165 0.496 0.781 1.401*** -0.274 0.904 
Census Tract (1.125) (1.544) (0.701) (2.175) (0.513) (2.360) (2.303) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,981 306,540 61,308 30,654 122,616 107,289 222,119 
R-squared 0.018 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.022 0.003 0.012 
        
Panel B: 2002 Q2 to 2006 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 2.323** 0.108 0.444 1.391 1.296** 0.855 1.446 
Census Tract (1.065) (1.577) (0.674) (2.071) (0.596) (1.376) (2.038) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,981 306,540 61,308 30,654 122,616 107,289 222,119 
R-squared 0.021 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.003 0.013 
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * 
denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  Eligibility ratio cutoff of 0.70 to 0.90 included 
in all columns in this table.  State and industry fixed effects are included in the regressions.  
Control variables include the percent of the population that is female, the percent of the 
population that is black, the percent of the population that is Hispanic, the average age of the 
population, the percent of the population without a high school diploma, the percent of the 
population with some college, the percent of the population with a college degree, the average 
income, the unemployment rate, and the percent of female headed households with children 
within the tract. 
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Table 2.8b: Effect of New Market Tax Credit Qualification Status on the Change in Existing 
Employment in a Census Tract with an Eligibility Ratio between 0.75 and 0.85 Classified by 
Industry.  
 Constr Manufact Transport Wholesale Retail FIRE Services 
Panel A: 2002 Q2 to 2004 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 1.363 1.099 0.675 2.581 2.188** 2.479** 2.992 
Census Tract (3.553) (0.704) (0.954) (3.360) (1.050) (1.194) (3.586) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,716 151,440 30,288 15,144 60,576 53,004 109,737 
R-squared 0.030 0.002 0.007 0.010 0.038 0.004 0.023 
        
Panel B: 2002 Q2 to 2006 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 2.012 1.206** 1.423** 2.299 2.378** 3.284* 2.580 
Census Tract (2.215) (0.575) (0.645) (3.375) (1.055) (1.756) (3.526) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,716 151,440 30,288 15,144 60,576 53,004 109,737 
R-squared 0.036 0.002 0.008 0.013 0.016 0.005 0.024 
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  Eligibility ratio cutoff of 0.75to 0.85 included in 
all columns in this table.  State and industry fixed effects are included in the regressions.  Control 
variables include the percent of the population that is female, the percent of the population that is 
black, the percent of the population that is Hispanic, the average age of the population, the 
percent of the population without a high school diploma, the percent of the population with some 
college, the percent of the population with a college degree, the average income, the 
unemployment rate, and the percent of female headed households with children within the tract. 
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Using 1994 as the Pre-Policy Change Year 
While applications for the NMTC were not accepted until July of 2002, because the legislation 
was passed in 2000 there may be concerns that 2002 is not the appropriate pre-policy change 
year.  To address this concern, we estimate the effect of the NMTC using 1994 as the pre-policy 
change year and 2002, 2004, and 2006 as the post-policy change years.  Because the D&B 
survey started in the early 1990s, there were some issues initially regarding the employment 
numbers.43  For that reason, we focus on the effect of the NMTC on new establishments. 
 Table 2.9 presents the results of the impact of the NMTC on the change in new firms 
using 1994 as the base year.  We find the same negative and statistically significant effect across 
all tracts, consistent with the selection issue we have argued is present throughout the paper.  We 
find a positive and statistically significant effect when we only consider those tracts between 
0.70 and 0.90 of the eligibility ratio, consistent with the results earlier in the paper.  We continue 
to find a positive effect when we restrict the sample to be even closer to the boundary at 0.75 and 
0.85, but the standard errors increase and we no long have statistical significance. 
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 In 1994, there were 831 tracts that reported having at least one new firm but no new employees at those firms.  In 
2002, there were no tracts with this reporting problem, and in 2004 and 2006 there were 3 and 4 respectively.  For 
this reason, we are not confident in the employment numbers in 1994, and therefore focus on the firm results. 
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Table 2.9: Effect of New Market Tax Credit Qualification Status on the Change in 
New Firms in Census Tracts in MSAs using 1994 as Base Year 
 
Entire Sample 
Eligibility Ratio 
0.70 to 0.90 
Eligibility Ratio 
0.75 to 0.85 
Panel A: 1994 Q2 to 2002 Q2 
NMTC Qualified -0.012*** 0.010** 0.010 
Census Tract (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,009,944 459,138 226,619 
R-squared 0.133 0.078 0.076 
    
Panel B: 1994 Q2 to 2004 Q2 
NMTC Qualified -0.006*** 0.004** 0.003 
Census Tract (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,871,385 898,157 443,444 
R-squared 0.054 0.029 0.032 
    
Panel C: 1994 Q2 to 2006 Q2 
NMTC Qualified -0.009*** 0.006*** 0.004 
Census Tract (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,874,040 899,042 443,916 
R-squared 0.061 0.042 0.048 
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  Only tracts located within 
an MSA are included in this table.  State and industry fixed effects are included in the 
regressions.  Control variables include the percent of the population that is female, the 
percent of the population that is black, the percent of the population that is Hispanic, 
the average age of the population, the percent of the population without a high school 
diploma, the percent of the population with some college, the percent of the 
population with a college degree, the average income, the unemployment rate, and the 
percent of female headed households with children within the tract. 
 
 
 When we consider the results across industries, we still find strong positive effects in 
FIRE and services in the 0.70 to 0.90 band, as is shown in Table 2.10a.  In Table 2.10b, when we 
look even closer to the boundary near 0.75 and 0.85, we find evidence that the coefficients tend 
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to be positive, but do not obtain statistical significance in almost all of the regressions.  Overall, 
our findings using 1994 as the pre-period year are consistent with the findings presented earlier 
in the paper using 2002 as the pre-policy change year.   
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Table 2.10a: Effect of New Market Tax Credit Qualification Status on the Change in New Firms 
in a Census Tract with an Eligibility Ratio between 0.70 and 0.90 Classified by Industry.  
 Constr Manufact Transport Wholesale Retail FIRE Services 
Panel A: 1994 Q2 to 2002 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 0.021 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.008*** 0.027*** 
Census Tract (0.017) (0.001) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,346 155,640 31,128 15,564 62,256 54,474 108,948 
R-squared 0.114 0.009 0.045 0.017 0.079 0.039 0.081 
        
Panel B: 1994 Q2 to 2004 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 0.013* 0.00003 -0.001 -0.0002 0.0012 0.003*** 0.012*** 
Census Tract (0.007) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,669 304,460 60,892 30,446 121,784 106,561 213,122 
R-squared 0.032 0.002 0.010 0.003 0.009 0.015 0.037 
        
Panel C: 1994 Q2 to 2006 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 0.012 0.001 0.005* 0.004 0.003 0.008*** 0.014*** 
Census Tract (0.009) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,714 304,760 60,952 30,476 121,904 106,666 213,332 
R-squared 0.043 0.006 0.018 0.003 0.014 0.028 0.052 
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  Eligibility ratio cutoff of 0.70 to 0.90 included in 
all columns in this table.  State and industry fixed effects are included in the regressions.  Control 
variables include the percent of the population that is female, the percent of the population that is 
black, the percent of the population that is Hispanic, the average age of the population, the percent 
of the population without a high school diploma, the percent of the population with some college, 
the percent of the population with a college degree, the average income, the unemployment rate, 
and the percent of female headed households with children within the tract. 
  
53 
 
Table 2.10b: Effect of New Market Tax Credit Qualification Status on the Change in New Firms in 
a Census Tract with an Eligibility Ratio between 0.75 and 0.85 Classified by Industry.  
 Constr Manufact Transport Wholesale Retail FIRE Services 
Panel A: 1994 Q2 to 2002 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 0.021 0.002 0.003 0.014 0.007 0.006 0.024 
Census Tract (0.026) (0.002) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014) (0.005) (0.021) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,523 76,820 15,364 7,682 30,728 26,887 53,774 
R-squared 0.115 0.011 0.054 0.023 0.080 0.041 0.078 
        
Panel B: 1994 Q2 to 2004 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 0.011 -0.0003 -0.003 -0.007 0.001 0.001 0.012 
Census Tract (0.012) (0.001) (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) (0.002) (0.010) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,548 150,320 30,064 15,032 60,128 52,612 105,224 
R-squared 0.038 0.003 0.017 0.005 0.010 0.018 0.040 
        
Panel C: 1994 Q2 to 2006 Q2 
NMTC Qualified 0.016 0.002*** 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.006 
Census Tract (0.016) (0.001) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,572 150,480 30,096 15,048 60,192 52,668 105,336 
R-squared 0.051 0.009 0.026 0.005 0.016 0.034 0.059 
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  Eligibility ratio cutoff of 0.70 to 0.90 included in 
all columns in this table.  State and industry fixed effects are included in the regressions.  Control 
variables include the percent of the population that is female, the percent of the population that is 
black, the percent of the population that is Hispanic, the average age of the population, the percent 
of the population without a high school diploma, the percent of the population with some college, 
the percent of the population with a college degree, the average income, the unemployment rate, 
and the percent of female headed households with children within the tract. 
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2.6  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this paper, we examine the effect of the New Markets Tax Credit on new businesses and 
employment levels at these new establishments.  However, there are selection issues that must be 
addressed when considering the effect of the policy on local jurisdictions.  First, when firms 
choose where to open their new enterprise, as there are likely to be unobservable attributes of the 
neighborhood affecting this decision.  Second, not all firms that applied for the NMTC received 
the credit, so there may be issues regarding which firms are selected for the program.  To address 
these concerns, we use a regression discontinuity design and a differencing strategy to compare 
census tracts just on either side of a plausibly exogenous eligibility ratio.  By utilizing this 
exogenous cutoff, we obtain causal estimates of the effect of the NMTC on the location decisions 
of new businesses. 
When we focus on tracts located in MSAs near the income eligibility ratio, we find that 
NMTC eligibility attracts new businesses and new employment to these areas in 2004 and 2006. 
When we stratify our results by industry, we find the effects on new employment are most 
concentrated in services and FIRE.  This is consistent with expectations, given that tax credits 
were primarily allocated towards real estate and social, health, and educational services.  We find 
positive effects on the number of new establishments across all industries, except for 
construction and transportation.  Taken together, this suggests that the policy allowed new firms 
to open in eligible areas, but there were limited employment effects across industries.   
The goal of the NMTC was to increase investment in struggling areas, with the hope that 
this investment will attract more businesses and spur growth.  While we do find increases in the 
total number of new firms in most industries, we do not find the same consistent effect when we 
focus on employment.  This is consistent with the research of McCulloch and Yellen (1977) 
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which suggested that capital subsidies may have perverse effects on businesses.  In particular, 
our research supports their claim that capital subsidies will cause firms to reallocate resources 
towards capital investments versus hiring low-skilled workers.  However, it should be noted that 
our findings are only applicable to those tracts that are close to the 0.80 eligibility ratio cutoff 
and cannot necessarily be generalized to tracts that are not near this boundary.  Also, given data 
limitations we are only able to estimate the short-term effects of the policy.  Future research 
should consider the long-run effects of the program, as it is important to know if these 
employment effects that we found have lasting effects on these areas. 
It should also be noted that there are possible spillover and sorting effects present, as 
firms may choose to relocate from one area that is ineligible to another area that is eligible for 
the tax credit.  Unfortunately, given the nature of our data we cannot measure these spillovers 
and movements of firms.  Future work should consider the spillover effects of the program on 
different areas and determine if these tax credits are simply causing firms to move from one area 
to another or if new business activity is being created through the policy. 
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Chapter 3 
Bad Ink: Visible Tattoos and Recidivism 
 
3.1  Introduction 
In 2011, over 600,000 inmates were released from prison (Carson and Sabol, 2011). This 
large influx of ex-offenders into American communities translates into large populations of 
individuals attempting to reenter the labor force. Ex-offenders are particularly important labor 
force participants because research suggests that employment post-release is important for 
reducing the likelihood of criminal activity and incarceration in the future44. In additional to their 
criminal record, educational background, lack of sills, and personal appearance all limit an ex-
offender’s propensity to obtain employment post-release. However few studies focus on the 
impact of personal appearance on the likelihood of obtaining employment post-release from 
prison (Freeman, 2003). Visible tattoos are one specific aspect of an individual’s personal 
appearance that may affect their likelihood of gaining employment. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that individuals with tattoos visible in the workplace may 
have fewer employment opportunities than people with similar qualifications and no visible 
tattoos. Visible tattoos may create even more of an employment barrier for the ex-offender 
population because potential employers may interpret the tattoos (correctly or incorrectly) as 
signals of criminality. Research on criminal signaling mechanisms details how some criminals 
use tattoos as a visual résumé for their prior criminal acts (Gambetta, 2009). If employers are 
aware that tattoos are used to signal criminality, then while interviewing potential employees 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Several articles citing anecdotal evidence argue that small-scale reentry programs emphasizing fast employment 
post-release successfully reduce recidivism rates of program participants compared to similar individuals recently 
released from prison that do not participate in work-first programs.  For an overview of the literature on small-scale 
reentry programs whose primary focus is on obtaining employment quickly after release please see Freeman, 2003; 
Tahmincioglu, 2010; Husock, 2012; Pia Negro, 2012; Rosenberg, 2012.   
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from a pool of ex-offenders, non-tattooed or non-visibly tattooed ex-offenders may seem more 
reformed than ex-offenders with visible tattoos. In this paper, I examine whether inmates with 
visible tattoos return to incarceration faster than non-tattooed inmates. 
Two recent criminology studies also attempt to estimate the relationship between visible 
tattoos and recidivism. Lozano et al. (2010) consider a small sample of inmates with prison 
tattoos, inmates with non-prison tattoos, and college students. The results from their study 
suggest that inmates with prison tattoos score higher on recidivism risk assessments than inmates 
without prison tattoos and college students. Waters (2012) expands upon Lozano et al. (2010) 
using data from the FDOC and examines the relationship between visible tattoos and the 
occurrence of recidivism within the last three years. The results suggest that inmates with visible 
tattoos are more likely to be reconvicted for new felony offenses and new violent offenses within 
three years.  
Although these studies take a first step at linking tattoos to recidivism, both have 
important limitations. Lozano et al. (2010) use a sample of 274 inmates and college students and 
examine the correlations between tattoo and criminal history variables. It is possible that the 
relationships found within their data are a function of this small sample size. Additionally, no 
regression analysis is used within their study, so they are unable to control for other factors 
related to recidivism. Waters (2012) builds on the work by Lozano et al. (2010) using logistic 
regressions to examine the likelihood of recidivism for inmates based on tattoo visibility. 
However, Waters (2012) considers only whether or not an inmate returned to prison, and fails to 
account for the timing of recidivism within the three year follow-up period. In that case, an 
inmate who returns to prison on the last day of the three year period he considers is treated 
identically to an inmate who returns to prison on the first day post-release.  
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In order to account for the differences in timing of recidivism, I use a log-logistic survival 
model to examine the relationship between visible tattoos and length of time until 
reincarceration. The dependent variable in this survival model contains two-parts, whether or not 
an inmate was reincarcerated, and the length of time until the re-incarceration. Previous work 
identifies the use of hazard or survival analysis to analyze recidivism as the preferred approach, 
as it accounts for both the timing and occurrence of re-offense (Baumer, 1997). I use data from 
the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) Offender Based Information System (OBIS) 
database, which provides demographic, criminal history, and tattoo description information on 
all inmates released from FDOC facilities during 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
One of the issues with estimating differences in recidivism of non-tattooed and tattooed 
inmates is potential self-selection into receiving a tattoo. Perhaps tattoos signal unobservable 
characteristics about individuals, which are correlated with factors related to the propensity to 
commit crimes and return to prison. To attempt to mitigate some of these selection issues, I 
compare the effects of tattoos within tattooed-subsamples of the prison population. First, I 
examine the effect of having a visible tattoo on recidivism, within the subsample of tattooed 
inmates. Next, I limit the sample even further to the subsample of visibly tattooed inmates. When 
considering all inmates who have self-selected into getting a visible tattoo, I isolate the effect of 
a tattoo located on the head, face, neck, or hands of an ex-offender. Although this process does 
not provide causal estimates, limiting the sample helps to eliminate some of the selection effects 
initially present. 
 I make three significant contributions to the literature on inmate tattoos and recidivism. 
First, I examine the largest sample considered thus far in the literature, 97,156 inmates, which 
provides the criminal history of all inmates exiting FDOC facilities over 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
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This dataset provides a complete picture of the population of inmates released from Florida 
prisons over three years and with a follow-up period of three years from their release. Second, I 
develop two classifications of tattoo visibility whereas only one previous study takes into 
account visibility and defines it as a tattoo located on the arms, hands, neck, or face of an 
individual (Waters, 2012). Whether or not a tattoo is visible in the workplace is dependent on the 
type of work environment in question and use of multiple measures of visibility sheds light on 
which tattoo locations matter most for employment. Finally, I extend previous work on tattoos 
and reoffense using the survival methodology suggested within the literature as the appropriate 
approach to examining recidivism.  
 The remainder of this paper progresses as follows. Section 3.2 describes the FDOC OBIS 
data. Sections 3.3 explains the methodology used to estimate the survival length of inmates in 
society before returning to prison. Section 3.4 presents the results and section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Data 
The Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) Offender Based Information System 
(OBIS) database includes inmate-level data on all individuals incarcerated within or released 
from FDOC facilities between October 1997 and October 2013. 45 For each inmate the database 
documents demographic information, criminal history record within Florida prisons, and 
descriptions of tattoos and their locations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The FDOC began recording all receipts and releases from FDOC facilities in October 1997 and thus data post-
1997 is complete, containing all inmates from that time period, whereas data on incarcerations pre-1997 is only 
included for inmates who returned to incarceration post-1997.  For example, if an inmate was incarcerated in 1998 
and was also previously incarcerated in an FDOC facility in 1960, that inmate’s criminal history includes both the 
1960 incarceration and the 1998 incarceration.  However, if an individual served time in a FDOC facility during 
1960 and did not recidivate post-1997, they do not appear within the FDOC OBIS database.  Therefore, I only 
consider information on inmates incarcerated after 1997 due to these sample issues. 
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The focus of this analysis is whether tattoo visibility affects recidivism. Previous research 
defines a tattoo as visible if located on the arms, hands, neck, or face of an individual (Waters, 
2012). Although this definition clearly captures visibility, whether or not a tattoo is visible is 
dependent on workplace attire in the occupation. As such, additional tests to examine different 
levels of visibility help to clarify if tattoos in some locations affect recidivism more than others. 
Furthermore, employers may interpret tattoos in different locations in different ways, especially 
as some tattoos become more common over time. It is possible that arm and leg tattoos are 
popular enough in the general population that employers’ decisions are not affected by the 
existence of a visible tattoo of this type. However, if face and neck tattoos are not as popular in 
the general population, then employers’ decisions may still reflect signals sent by these tattoos. 
The use of multiple visibility classifications allows for the examination of those differences. 
The unique data from FDOC allows for two classifications of visibility to be tested. The 
first classification, visible_1, considers tattoos on the face, head, neck, and hands as visible. 
Visible_1 represents tattoos visible if a suit or long sleeves and pants are worn each day in the 
workplace. Table 3.1a presents summary statistics on the entire sample of inmates used within 
this analysis. Roughly 22% of ex-offenders within my sample have tattoos on their face, head, 
neck, or hands. Figure 3.1 depicts the visible_1 classification visually. A less stringent 
classification, visible_2, classifies visible tattoos as those appearing on the face, head, neck, 
hands, arms, or legs. The second visibility classification represents tattoos visible if an individual 
is wearing a t-shirt and shorts. Roughly 63% of inmates within my sample have tattoos located 
on the face, head, neck, hands, arms, or legs. The visible_2 classification is represented visually 
in figure 3.2. Exploiting different levels of tattoo visibility also allows for a robustness check to 
ensure that my classification of visibility is not driving the results.  
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Table 3.1a: Summary Statistics for Entire Sample. 
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Survival Indicators 
Failure 97156 0.221 0.415 0 1 
Days until recidivism 97156 974 266 0 1095 
      
Tattoo Indicators 
Tattoo 97156 0.694 0.461 0 1 
Visible_1 97156 0.216 0.412 0 1 
Visible_2 97156 0.634 0.482 0 1 
      
Demographic Controls 
Black 97156 0.461 0.499 0 1 
Asian/Pacific Islander 97156 0.0001 0.011 0 1 
Hispanic 97156 0.036 0.186 0 1 
White 97156 0.500 0.500 0 1 
American Indian 97156 0.0009 0.030 0 1 
Age at release 97156 36 11 15 88 
Gender 97156 0.882 0.323 0 1 
      
Criminal Controls 
Violent offense in history 96907 0.218 0.413 0 1 
Property offense in history 96907 0.349 0.477 0 1 
Length of last incarceration 95756 1383 10856 365 367745 
Number of previous incarcerations 97156 2 2 1 16 
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Table 3.1b: Summary Statistics for Tattooed Subsample. 
 Visible_1 Visible_2 Non-Visible Tattooed 
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Survival Indicators 
Failure 0.351 0.477 0.267 0.442 0.165 0.371 
Days until recidivism 907 308 951 283 1003 242 
       
Demographic Controls 
Black 0.447 0.497 0.457 0.498 0.320 0.466 
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.019 
Hispanic 0.044 0.204 0.036 0.186 0.040 0.196 
White 0.506 0.500 0.504 0.500 0.637 0.481 
American Indian 0.001 0.037 0.001 0.031 0.001 0.032 
Age at release 30 8 33 9 36 10 
Gender 0.877 0.328 0.900 0.300 0.740 0.439 
       
Criminal Controls 
Violent offense in history 0.213 0.409 0.224 0.417 0.166 0.373 
Property offense in history 0.394 0.489 0.372 0.483 0.317 0.465 
Length of last incarceration 981 5146 1060 5017 1126 6919 
Number of previous 
incarcerations 2 2 2 2 2 2 
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of Areas Comprising the Visible_1 Classification. 
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Figure 3.2: Diagram of Areas Comprising the Visible_2 Classification. 
 
 
 
 
 
Information on each inmate’s tattoos is only available for the most recent prison spell the 
inmate experience in Florida. Thus, the tattoo data provided are accurate for the most recent 
incarceration and release from prison, but may not represent the tattoos an inmate had during 
previous incarcerations. As a result, I am unable to examine changes in the effect of tattoos over 
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time.46 Due to the lack of information on how an inmate’s tattoos change over time, I examine 
the effect of tattoos on prisoners released in or after 2008 assuming that five years is a reasonable 
time period where the amount tattoos may not change dramatically for most inmates. I consider 
inmates released from Florida prisons in 2008, 2009, and 2010, and track these inmates for 
returns to FDOC facilities within three years post release. Additionally, this three year follow-up 
period is consistent with several previous studies which examine recidivism as rearrest, 
reoffense, or reincarceration within three years following release.47 After limiting the FDOC 
OBIS data to inmates released in 2008, 2009, or 2010, the final dataset used within my analysis 
consists of 97,156 inmates. 
To measure days until recidivism, I utilize FDOC data on receipt and release dates of all 
inmates released between 2008 and 2010, into or out of FDOC prison facilities during three years 
post-release.48 Recidivism length is calculated as the difference in days between an inmates’ first 
release from prison between 2008 and 2010, and their next receipt into an FDOC prison facility, 
if any, during the follow-up period. As I limit the definition of recidivism to a three year follow-
up period, inmates who were reincarcerated more than three years from their initial release are 
censored and listed as not returning to prison. The average number of days until recidivism for 
all inmates within the sample is 974 days. Table 3.1b presents summary statistics for tattooed 
inmates within my sample, separated by tattoo classification. When separated based on tattoo 
visibility, inmates with non-visible tattoos survived an average of 1003 days without 
reincarceration. Inmates with visible_2 tattoos, tattoos on the face, head, hands, neck, arms, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 I am currently waiting on a response to a request to FDOC for access to tattoo data over time. 
47 For example, Benda and Toombs, 2002; Langan and Levin, 2002; Duwe and Donnay, 2008; Waters, 2012.   
48 The FDOC operates prisons within the state, whereas jails are under county supervision.  Thus, I am unable to 
include time served at jails in this calculation because the FDOC OBIS database includes only prison receipts and 
releases.  
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legs, spent an average of 951 days in society without returning to prison, whereas inmates with 
tattoos specifically on their face, head, neck, or hands, returned to prison in 907 days on average. 
Failure is a dummy variable indicating whether an inmate returned to incarceration 
during the three year follow-up period. Roughly 22% of inmates in my sample returned to prison 
during the three year follow-up period. 49This calculated recidivism rate is comparable to those 
identified in FDOC publications, which place three-year recidivism rates for inmates released 
between 2004 and 2008 at an average of 31.5% (FDOC, 2013). When the sample is separated 
based on tattoo visibility, only 17% of non-visibly tattooed inmates returned to incarceration 
during the follow-up period. However, inmates with visible_2 tattoos has a recidivism rate of 
27% during the follow-up period. Inmates with visible_1 tattoos, located on the head, face, neck, 
or hands, had the highest failure rate of 35% within the follow-up period, roughly double that of 
non-visibly tattooed inmates.  
Next, I construct several variables to control for the effect of prior criminal history on 
recidivism. Inmates with prior criminal histories may be more likely to return to incarceration, as 
this may reflect a criminal lifestyle rather than an isolated incident.50 Another area of previous 
research suggests that the prison environment may ‘harden’ offenders.51 To control for the effect 
of prior criminal activity or incarcerations on future recidivism risk, I construct a variable that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Although this recidivism rate may seem low compared to rates which include both jails and prisons, FDOC 
publications also consider only prisons operated by the State of Florida.  The similarity between FDOC publications 
and my results suggests my calculations are accurate. 
50 Langan and Levin (2002) suggest that the number of prior offenses or incarcerations affect recidivism risk.   
51 Chen and Shapiro (2007) and Drago et al. (2011) find evidence that harsher prison conditions may increase 
recidivism.  The FDOC OBIS database provides the custody classification of each inmates’ most recent 
incarceration.  For inmates who do not return to incarceration during the follow-up period, the custody level variable 
allows for the control of the effect of security level on recidivism.  However, as FDOC only provides the custody 
description for the most recent incarceration, the custody variable for inmates who returned to incarceration during 
the follow-up period measures their second incarceration during the period.  As such, the custody variable for 
inmates who recidivated does not provide a control for the effect of security level on recidivism.   
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counts the number of prior incarcerations of an inmate. This variable ranges from 1 to 16 prior 
incarcerations for inmates within my sample.  
Additionally, it is possible that an inmate who was recently released from a long-term 
sentence may have greater difficulty adjusting to civilian life than an inmate sentenced to a 
shorter prison term. If that is the case, time served and recidivism should be positively related 
(Baumer, 1997). It is also possible that as the length of the prison sentence increases, the 
likelihood of recidivism decreases. To control for the potential effect of prison term length on 
recidivism, I construct a variable which measures the length in days of the most recent sentence 
each inmate was released from during the follow-up period.52. The length of the most recent 
incarceration for inmates within my sample ranges from 365 days (1 year) to 367,745 days 
(1,000 years).53  
I also control for violent and property offenses within each inmates’ history. The FBI 
classifies violent crimes as inclusive of rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and murder.54 Research 
suggests that violent offenders are more likely to recidivate than similar non-violent offenders 
(Baumer, 1997; Langan and Levin, 2002). Offenders with property crimes may also be more 
likely to recidivate as property crimes may be a source of income for these individuals once 
released (Baumer, 1997; Langan and Levin, 2002).  
The FDOC data provides a description of each offense in an inmates’ criminal history. To 
create dummy variables to control for prior violent and property offenses, I search within the text 
description provided55. The dummy variable controlling for violent crimes in an inmate’s history 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Findings on whether prison term lengths affect recidivism are mixed.  See Baumer (1997) for additional 
explanations. 
53 I consider only prison sentences, which in Florida start at a minimum of 365 days.  Shorter sentences are served in 
jails.  Inmates serving multiple life sentences have prison sentences that compile to 1,000 years. 
54 Descriptions of property and violent crime descriptions are taken from www.FBI.gov. 
55 I create dummy variables for each of the FBI classifications by searching the FDOC offense descriptions for these 
words or their abbreviations. For example, the FDOC descriptions abbreviate murder to “mur”. 
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is constructed as equal to one if an inmate had a previous rape, robbery, homicide, or murder in 
their FDOC record, and equal to zero if not.56 The same process is used to create a dummy 
variable to control for the FBI’s list of property crimes; burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft. 
Within my sample, roughly 22% of inmates had prior violent offenses, and roughly 35% had 
prior property crime offenses at the time of release. 
To control for demographic factors related to recidivism, I construct control variables for 
age, race, and gender of inmates at the time of release. Previous research suggests that age, 
gender, race, and previous criminal activity are the most consistent predictors of recidivism.57. 
Research on the relationship between gender and recidivism suggests recidivism risk is higher 
for men than women58.  Within my analysis, male inmates account for roughly 88% percent of 
the sample.  
Race is also an important determinant for recidivism and previous studies suggest Black 
inmates are more likely to recidivate than White inmates59. Race is defined within my analysis 
using the classifications from the FDOC OBIS database (Black, White, Hispanic, Asian or 
Pacific Islander, American Indian, or unknown). Roughly 50% of inmates within my sample are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 The construction of this variable is limited in that the FDOC offense list may abbreviate or describe offenses 
differently than the FBI.  For example, a search for “rape” returns no results, but there are many sexual assault 
offenses listed within this description.  This limitation may underestimate the number of criminals with previous 
violent crime offenses.   
57 These variables are consistently found to be main determinants of recidivism in the following studies: Jurik, 1983; 
Visher and Linster, 1990; Hanley and Latessa, 1997; Gainey et al., 2000; Kruttschnitt et al., 2000; Benda and 
Toombs, 2002; Spohn and Holleran, 2002.  Previous research suggests less consistently that employment status, 
marital status, and drug use post-release affect recidivism risk, with marriage and employment negatively affecting 
recidivism and drug use positively affecting recidivism.  Requests for data on those variables from FDOC was 
denied due to confidentiality issues.  Kling (2006) matches encrypted social security numbers from FDOC to those 
listed on unemployment claims from Florida’s unemployment insurance office, providing a link between inmates 
and employment status post-release.  However, this data is not publically available and requests to access it were 
denied.   
58 See Baumer, 1997; Gainey et al., 2000; Langan and Levin, 2002; Spohn and Holleran, 2002; Duwe and Donnay, 
2008; Waters 2012. 
59 The following studies find black inmates are more likely to recidivate than white inmates: Blumstein et al., 1986; 
Beck and Shipley, 1987; Anderson et al., 1991; Helpburn and Albonetti, 1994; Gendreau et al., 1996; Beck and 
Shipley 1997; Benda and Toombs, 2002; Langan and Levin, 2002; Spohn and Holleran, 2002; Langan et al., 2003; 
Kubrin and Stewart, 2006; Bales and Mears, 2008; Kohl et al., 2008 
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White, 46% are Black, 3.6% are Hispanic, and the remaining 0.4% are either Asian, Pacific 
Islander, American Indian, or Unknown.  
Age at release has also been identified within previous research to negatively affect 
recidivism risk60. It is possible that this is a result of learning by doing, and that criminals 
become more efficient over time. Another possibility is that once older criminals find 
employment they substitute into more stable lifestyles (Uggen, 2000). Fifteen years of age is the 
minimum age at release within the sample and the maximum age is 88.61 62 I limit the sample to 
exclude inmates who are listed in the FDOC database but are deceased as they do not have the 
opportunity to commit future crimes.  
 
3.3  Methodology 
When estimating recidivism, it is important to take into account both the timing and 
occurrence of an individual’s return to prison. Binary indicators which account only for the 
occurrence of recidivism, treat ex-offenders that return to prison early in the follow-up period 
identical to those that return to prison several months or years later. Ignoring these potential 
differences in the length of time spent outside of prison is problematic because the additional 
time an ex-offender survives in society translates into time the department of corrections is not 
responsible for the cost of housing that individual.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Many studies find that criminal activity dissipates as age increases.  For example, please see Visher et al., 1991; 
Hepburn and Albonetti, 1994; Baumer, 1997; Benedict et al., 1998; Uggen, 2000; Benda and Toombs, 2002; Spohn 
and Holleran, 2002; Windzio, 2006; Duwe and Donnay, 2008, Lozano et al., 2010, Waters, 2012. 
61 The FDOC OBIS database contains a birthdate for each inmate, which I use to calculate age at release for each 
inmate’s first release during the follow-up period. 
62 Cross-checks of my calculation of age at release with the FDOC OBIS database for the inmates’ whose ages are 
the minimum and maximum verify the validity of the calculation.   
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The number of days between an inmate’s release from prison and reincarceration is 
defined as the survival length for each inmate and a failure dummy variable indicates whether or 
not an inmate returned to incarceration during the follow-up period.  𝑥! is defined as the vector of 
independent variables related to the likelihood of recidivism for individual 𝑖.  Then, I define 𝛾 as 
a vector of coefficients of 𝑥!.  The initial survivor function for inmate 𝑖  is 
(1) 𝑆! = exp   − ℎ 𝑇; 𝑥!𝛾 𝑑𝑇!!  
Where 𝑆! indicates survival time of inmate 𝑖 in society before returning to prison, ℎ .  indicates 
the hazard rate of returning to prison, 𝑡 indicates the current time period, and 𝑇 indicates the total 
number of time periods considered within the analysis.   
Several previous articles utilize the Cox proportional hazards model to study recidivism 
(Baumer, 1997; Benda and Toombs, 2002; Windzio, 2006, Duwe and Donnay, 2008). This 
model assumes proportionality of the hazard ratios across treatment and non-treatment groups. 
To check whether the proportionality assumption holds for my data, I examine log-log survival 
plots for tattooed inmates versus non-tattooed inmates, as shown in Figure 3.3. Parallel survival 
plots would indicate the proportional hazards assumption is not violated. However, as seen in 
figure 3.3, the log-log survival functions for tattooed and non-tattooed inmates within my sample 
are not parallel. A further test of the proportionality assumption using Schoenfeld residuals 
reveals that the assumption is violated within my data and thus a proportional hazards model is 
inappropriate within this analysis.63 The functional form of ℎ .  Must be flexible enough to fit 
hazard rates found within the dataset (Douglas, 1998).  Using the Cox proportional hazards 
model places an overly restrictive functional form assumption on the data within my analysis.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Although figure 3.3 only depicts the violation of the proportionality assumption for the tattoo dummy variable, 
both visibility variables, visible_1 and visible-2, also violate this assumption.   
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Figure 3.3: Log-log Plots of Survival Functions for Tattooed versus Non-tattooed Inmates using Cox 
Proportional Hazard Estimation. 
 
 
 
 
Given that using a proportional hazard model to examine the data used within my 
analysis would be inappropriate, I use an accelerated failure time (AFT) survival model with a 
log-logistic distribution to estimate the relationship between visible tattoos and days until 
recidivism.64  The log-logistic distribution for the starting hazard is a flexible functional form 
which allows for a non-monotonic hazard function.  The starting hazard function for the log-
logistic survival model is given by the following equation: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The log-logistic distribution provides the best fit to my data however the use of other distributions within the AFT 
framework produces similar results to those found within this paper. 
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(2) ℎ 𝑡; 𝑥!𝛾 = !"# !!! !!!!!!!!"# !!! !!    
Where 𝜆 is a shape parameter describing the relationship between hazard and duration.  For log-
logisitc models, 𝜆 < 1   indicates hazard declines with duration and 𝜆 > 1 indicates hazard rises 
and then falls.  
I begin by estimating the days until recidivism for the entire sample of ex-offenders 
released during 2008, 2009, and 2010.  However, if selection into getting a tattoo indicates some 
type of unobservable characteristic that makes an inmate more likely to commit future crimes 
and thus return to incarceration, it is not surprising that the results show that non-tattooed 
inmates survive longer. As a first step to addressing this selection effect, I also examine only the 
subset of tattooed inmates in my analysis.   
However, the same selection effect can be identified with regards to tattoo location 
decisions.  An ex-offender who chose to get a visible tattoo may be inherently different in 
observable characteristics than an ex-offender who chose to locate their tattoo somewhere hidden 
by clothing.  To attempt to mitigate some of these selection effects, I again restrict my sample 
and consider only inmates with visible tattoos.   
Concerns about the effect of unobservable characteristics on recidivism still remain.  
However, given the available data, these are the most reasonable estimates I can currently obtain.  
Additionally, the use of survival methodology to address the timing and occurrence of recidivism 
is still an improvement over the current literature.   
Although the use of a survival model is advantageous over probit or logit regressions as it 
takes into account both the timing and occurrence of recidivism, standard survival models 
inherently assume that all observations eventually experience failure, although some may be 
censored in the data.  In the case of recidivism, this assumption implies that all ex-offenders will 
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eventually return to prison and in the cases where this does not occur within the data, it is 
because the time frame ends before the failure can occur.   
 Split-population duration models do not require eventual failure for all observations, and 
instead allow for the possibility that some observations never experience failure.  Duration 
models of this type are directly applicable to recidivism given that some ex-offenders will never 
return to prison.  In a future draft of this paper, I will detail the split-population duration model 
and present results under that specification.     
 
3.4  Results 
a. Survival Results for Entire Sample 
Table 3.2a contains estimates for the log-logistic survival time of ex-offenders using the 
entire sample of inmates released during 2008, 2009, or 2010. The baseline specification is 
presented in column (1), column (2) expands upon column (1) with the inclusion of control 
variables mentioned earlier, and column (3) expands upon column (2) by including county fixed 
effects to control for county-level differences that may affect recidivism rates, such as 
differences in clearance rates across counties.  
i.  Estimated Survival Length Results 
Using the constant from the log-logistic survival estimates, an estimate for the median 
predicted baseline survival length can be obtained. Recall that within this analysis, recidivism is 
measured as reincarceration, and thus survival length is the number of days an ex-offender lives 
in society without returning to incarceration.  
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Table 3.2a: Loglogistic Survival Regressions of Tattooed versus Non-Tattooed Inmates. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Tattoo -0.637*** -0.395*** -0.391*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) Black  -0.026 -0.029 
  (0.165) (0.166) Asian/Pacific Islander  -0.014 -0.087 
  (0.787) (0.778) Hispanic  0.011 -0.002 
  (0.168) (0.169) White  -0.184 -0.164 
  (0.165) (0.166) American Indian  -0.316 -0.164 
  (0.294) (0.289) Age at release  0.051*** 0.050*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) Gender  -0.263*** -0.266*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) Violent offense in history  0.061*** 0.040*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) Property offense in history  -0.043*** -0.064*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) Length of last incarceration  -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) Number of previous incarcerations  -0.426*** -0.428*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) Constant 8.506*** 7.910*** 7.658*** 
 0.017 0.169 0.175 
County Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Observations 97,040 95,645 95,645 
Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Significance is denoted by *** , **, and * indicating p<0.01, p<0.05, 
and p<0.1 respectively. The dependent variable in this analysis is comprised of two parts, a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not an inmate returned to incarceration during the three year follow-up period, and a timing 
variable indicating the number of days an inmate ‘survived’ in society. The tattoo variable is a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not an inmate is tattooed. Demographic control variables include gender, race (Black, White, 
Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander, American Indian), and Age at release. Length of the most recent prison term, 
violent or property crimes in an inmate’s history, and the number of previous incarcerations are also controlled for. 
County fixed effects control for unobservable differences across counties, such as differences in clearance rates. The 
county variable lists the county in which the most recent crime for each inmate was committed.  
 
75 
 
The median predicted baseline survival length from the baseline specification is 4,944 
days.65 Based on the estimates presented in the baseline specification, having a tattoo decreases 
the median expected survival length by 2,329 days. Upon the inclusion of control variables in 
column (2), the median predicted baseline survival length drops to 2,724 days. Once controls are 
included, ex-offenders with tattoos survive on average 1,697 days less than ex-offenders without 
tattoos. Finally column (3) presents the most complete specification within table 3.2a, and 
includes estimates from log-logistic survival regressions of the tattoo dummy variable, all control 
variables, and county-level fixed effects. The median predicated baseline survival length based 
on the estimates presented in column (3) is 2,118 days. Based on these estimates, ex-offenders 
without tattoos survive on average 1,249 days longer than ex-offenders with tattoos. 
The results for control variables for gender, previous property offenses, and the number 
of previous incarcerations are consistent with previous literature.  The gender dummy variable 
indicates that female offenders survive longer than male offenders. Ex-offenders with property 
offenses in their criminal histories tend to return to incarceration faster than those without 
property offenses.66  As the number of previous incarcerations increases, the estimated survival 
time decreases, which is consistent with the finding that inmates who are incarcerated often are 
more committed to or involved in a criminal lifestyle (Baumer, 1997). 
There are some findings for the control variables within my analysis which diverge from 
previous work.  Race does not significantly impact survival of ex-offenders within my analysis.67 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Although the follow-up period within my analysis is limited to a three year period, or 1095 days, it is not 
surprising that the baseline survival length exceeds that threshold given that roughly 78% of ex-offenders in my 
sample do not return to incarceration within three years, and that in the baseline specification I have not controlled 
for some factors which serve to decrease expected survival time.   
66 Baumer, 1997 and Langan and Levin, 2002 also find this result.   
67 Although other papers find that race has a differential effect on recidivism (Blumstein et al., 1986; Beck and 
Shipley, 1987; Anderson et al., 1991; Helpburn and Albonetti, 1994; Gendreau et al., 1996; Beck and Shipley 1997; 
Benda and Toombs, 2002; Langan and Levin, 2002; Spohn and Holleran, 2002; Langan et al., 2003; Kubrin and 
Stewart, 2006; Bales and Mears, 2008; Kohl et al., 2008)) this may be a feature of small sample sizes used in some 
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Additionally, although the length of last incarceration is significantly related to survival time, the 
estimated impact equals zero, and thus the effect of the length of the last incarceration is not 
economically significant.  Finally, based on my estimates ex-offenders convicted of previous 
violent offenses are expected to survive longer than those without previous violent offense 
convictions. Using column (3) from Table 3.2a, the coefficient on violent offense in history of 
0.040 indicates an increase in median predicted baseline survival time of 220 days. However, in 
later specifications I limit the sample to only tattooed inmates and the significance of this result 
disappears. Overall, the estimates from columns (1), (2), and (3) all indicate that having a tattoo 
has a negative and significant relationship with survival length.68  
ii. Time Ratio Results 
Table 3.2b presents the same specifications as table 3.2a, instead listing time ratio results, 
which offer a different interpretation than log-logistic coefficients. Time ratio coefficients 
represent the relationship between a one unit change in a given variable and estimated survival 
length.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
analyses. It is also possible that the lack of significance of race in affecting recidivism is a unique feature of the 
Florida-specific data I am using 
68 I have also run regressions looking only at the subsets of male versus female offenders, black versus white 
offenders, violent versus non-violent offenders, and offenders with and without property crimes in their history.  The 
results consistently show a negative and significant relationship between the likelihood of survival and the instance 
of a visible tattoo.  To see the results of these robustness checks, please contact the author.   
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Table 3.2b: Loglogistic Survival Regressions of Tattooed versus Non-Tattooed Inmates. Time 
Ratios Reported. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Tattoo 0.529*** 0.674*** 0.676*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) Black  0.974 0.972 
  (0.161) (0.161) Asian/Pacific Islander  0.986 0.916 
  (0.776) (0.713) Hispanic  1.012 0.998 
  (0.170) (0.169) White  0.832 0.849 
  (0.137) (0.141) American Indian  0.729 0.713 
  (0.214) (0.207) Age at release  1.052*** 1.052*** 
  (0.001) (0.0009) Gender  0.769*** 0.767*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) Violent offense in history  1.063*** 1.041*** 
  (0.016) (0.015) Property offense in history  0.958*** 0.938*** 
  (0.013) (0.012) Length of last incarceration  1.000*** 1.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) Number of previous incarcerations  0.653*** 0.652*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) Constant 4945.164*** 2724.980*** 2116.502*** 
 (83.318) (460.669) (369.828) 
County Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Observations 97,040 95,645 95,645 
Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Significance is denoted by *** , **, and * indicating p<0.01, p<0.05, 
and p<0.1 respectively. The dependent variable in this analysis is comprised of two parts, a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not an inmate returned to incarceration during the three year follow-up period, and a timing 
variable indicating the number of days an inmate ‘survived’ in society. The tattoo variable is a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not an inmate is tattooed. Demographic control variables include gender, race (Black, White, 
Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander, American Indian), and Age at release. Length of the most recent prison term, 
violent or property crimes in an inmate’s history, and the number of previous incarcerations are also controlled for. 
County fixed effects control for unobservable differences across counties, such as differences in clearance rates. The 
county variable lists the county in which the most recent crime for each inmate was committed.  
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Time ratio values greater than one signify that unit increases in the given variable 
correspond to increase in the survival length by the time ratio subtracted by 1. Examining table 
3.2b column (3) shows a statistically significant time ratio of 1.052 for the variable, age at 
release. This indicates that a one year increase in age at release is related to an increase in the 
expected survival time of 5.2%. This result is consistent with previous research suggesting that 
as inmates age they are less likely to recidivate (Uggen, 2000).  
Time ratios less than one correspond to percent decreases in predicted survival time for 
each unit increase in the variable being considered. Again looking at table 3.2b column (3), the 
time ratio for the gender variable is 0.767, which corresponds to a decrease in predicted survival 
time by 23.3%. This indicates that survival times for male inmates are on average 23.3% lower 
than predicted survival times for female inmates.  
The baseline specification in table 3.2b suggests that inmates with tattoos have an 
expected survival time 47.1% lower than inmates without tattoos. When control variables are 
included in column (2), inmates with tattoos have an estimated survival time 32.6% lower than 
inmates without tattoos. Column (3) includes control variables and county fixed effects to control 
for differences in clearance rates across counties. The results from column (3) indicate that 
inmates with tattoos have an expected survival time 32.4% lower than inmates without tattoos.  
The results presented in tables 3.2a and 3.2b are limited given that inmates with tattoos 
may be inherently different in unobservable characteristics than non-tattooed inmates due to self-
selecting into getting a tattoo. In order to attempt to remove the self-selection effect of getting a 
tattoo from the comparison of inmates, I now consider two subsets of inmates who self-selected 
into being tattooed. 
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b.  Survival Results for Tattooed and Visibly Tattooed Subsamples 
The results from the regressions on tattooed and visibly tattooed inmate subsamples are 
presented in tables 3.3a and 3.3b. Columns (1) and (2) in tables 3.3a and 3.3b consider the 
tattooed subsample of inmates.  Column (3) in tables 3.3a and 3.3b is further limited to include 
only the subsample of inmates who self-selected into receiving visible tattoos.  Again, table 3.3a 
presents the log-logistic regression coefficients and table 3.3b presents the time ratio coefficients. 
Estimates for control variables in all columns within tables 3.3a and 3.3b follow the expected 
signs mentioned earlier. 
i. Estimated Survival Length Results 
The results from column (1) table 3.3a suggest that ex-offenders with tattoos on the face, 
head, neck, or hands return to incarceration faster than other tattooed ex-offenders. Specifically, 
visible_1 tattooed ex-offenders recidivate 714 days earlier than other tattooed ex-offenders. The 
results from column (2) compare ex-offenders with tattoos on face, head, neck, hands, arms, or 
legs, to ex-offenders with tattoos in other locations. The results from the specification in column 
(2) suggest that ex-offenders with visible_2 tattoos have a predicted median survival length 530 
days shorter than ex-offenders with non-visible tattoos.  
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Table 3.3a: Loglogistic Survival Regressions of Inmate Subsamples. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Visible_1 Visible_2 Visible_3 
Visibility classification -0.320*** -0.203*** -0.306*** 
 (0.013) (0.028) (0.013) 
Black -0.009 0.030 -0.028 
 (0.173) (0.171) (0.174) 
Asian/Pacific Islander -0.190 -0.182 -0.340 
 (0.746) (0.768) (0.780) 
Hispanic -0.023 -0.012 -0.045 
 (0.177) (0.174) (0.178) 
White -0.160 -0.133 -0.187 
 (0.173) (0.171) (0.174) 
American Indian -0.168 -0.179 -0.217 
 (0.328) (0.326) (0.333) 
Age at release 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.054*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gender -0.287*** -0.250*** -0.317*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) 
Violent offense in history 0.025 0.029* 0.026 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Property offense in history -0.055*** -0.058*** -0.051*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Length of last incarceration -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of previous incarcerations -0.450*** -0.458*** -0.449*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 7.374*** 7.263*** 7.370*** 
 (0.183) (0.183) (0.185) 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 66,574 66,574 60,843 
Columns (1) and (2), present results for the tattooed subsample, column (3) presents results for the visibly tattooed subsample of 
inmates. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Significance is denoted by *** , **, and * indicating p<0.01, p<0.05, and 
p<0.1 respectively. The dependent variable in this analysis is comprised of two parts, a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an inmate returned to incarceration during the three year follow-up period, and a timing variable indicating the number of days an 
inmate ‘survived’ in society. These regressions are limited to the tattooed subsample. The visible_1 variable is a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not an inmate has a tattoo located on the face, head, neck or hands. Visible_2 is a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not an inmate has a tattoo located on the face, head, neck, hands, arms, or legs. The visible_3 classification 
compares the effect of having a visible_1 tattoo (face, head, neck, or hands) within the visibly tattooed subsample. That is, 
column 3 is limited to only inmates with either visible_1 or visible_2 tattoos. Demographic control variables include gender, race 
(Black, White, Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander, American Indian), and Age at release. Length of the most recent prison term, 
violent or property crimes in an inmate’s history, and the number of previous incarcerations are also controlled for. County fixed 
effects control for unobservable differences across counties, such as differences in clearance rates. The county variable lists the 
county in which the most recent crime for each inmate was committed. 
 
81 
 
However, the same caveat from earlier regarding self-selection still applies. It is possible 
that individuals choosing visible tattoo locations are inherently different from those choosing to 
get tattoos in non-visible locations. These differences may be unobservable and correlated with 
factors affecting recidivism. In an attempt to minimize this self-selection even further, column 
(3) considers the effect of a tattoo located on the face, head, neck, or hands, a visible_1 tattoo, on 
days until recidivism within the subset of visibly tattooed inmates.  Recall, tattoos are considered 
visible if located on head, face, neck, hands, arms, or legs. Column (3) considers only those 
inmates who self-selected into receiving visible tattoos, in turn minimizing the unobservable 
differences associated with choosing to receive a visible tattoo.  The variable of interest in 
column (3) is visible_1, which represents tattoos located on the head, face, neck, or hands of an 
individual.   
The results from column (3) follow a similar pattern. As before, inmates with tattoos 
located on their face, head, neck, or hands, return to incarceration faster than inmates with tattoos 
in other visible locations. Ex-offenders with visible_1 tattoos located on their face, head, neck, or 
hands fail 674 days earlier than ex-offenders with visible tattoos in other locations.  
ii.  Time Ratio Results 
The time ratio results for these regressions are presented in table 3.3b. Column (1) 
suggests that inmates with visible_1 tattoos have an expected survival time 27.4% lower than ex-
offenders with tattoos that are not located on the face, head, neck, or hands. Column (2) presents 
a similar estimate suggesting that ex-offenders with visible_2 tattoos have an expected survival 
time 18.4% lower than ex-offenders with non-visible tattoos.  Column (3), which contains 
estimates examining only ex-offenders with visible tattoos, suggests that inmates with tattoos on 
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their head, face, neck, or hands return to incarceration 26.4% faster than ex-offenders with 
visible tattoos not located on the head, face, neck, or hands.  
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Table 3.3b: Loglogistic Survival Regressions of Inmate Subsamples. Time Ratios Reported. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Visibility classification  0.726*** 0.816*** 0.736*** 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.010) Black 0.991 1.031 0.972 
 (0.172) (0.176) (0.170) Asian/Pacific Islander 0.827 0.834 0.712 
 (0.617) (0.640) (0.555) Hispanic 0.977 0.988 0.956 
 (0.173) (0.172) (0.170) White 0.852 0.875 0.830 
 (0.148) (0.149) (0.145) American Indian 0.846 0.836 0.805 
 (0.277) (0.273) (0.268) Age at release 1.054*** 1.059*** 1.055*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Gender 0.750*** 0.779*** 0.728*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) Violent offense in history 1.026 1.029* 1.026 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) Property offense in history 0.946*** 0.943*** 0.950*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) Length of last incarceration 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Number of previous 
incarcerations 0.638*** 0.632*** 0.639*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) Constant 1594.642*** 1426.883*** 1588.013*** 
 (292.423) (260.370) (293.848) 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 66,574 66,574 60,843 
Columns (1) and (2), present results for the tattooed subsample, column (3) presents results for the visibly tattooed 
subsample of inmates. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Significance is denoted by *** , **, and * 
indicating p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively. The dependent variable in this analysis is comprised of two parts, 
a dummy variable indicating whether or not an inmate returned to incarceration during the three year follow-up 
period, and a timing variable indicating the number of days an inmate ‘survived’ in society. These regressions are 
limited to the tattooed subsample. The visible_1 variable is a dummy variable indicating whether or not an inmate 
has a tattoo located on the face, head, neck or hands. Visible_2 is a dummy variable indicating whether or not an 
inmate has a tattoo located on the face, head, neck, hands, arms, or legs. The visible_3 classification compares the 
effect of having a visible_1 tattoo (face, head, neck, or hands) within the visibly tattooed subsample. That is, column 
3 is limited to only inmates with either visible_1 or visible_2 tattoos. Demographic control variables include gender, 
race (Black, White, Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander, American Indian), and Age at release. Length of the most 
recent prison term, violent or property crimes in an inmate’s history, and the number of previous incarcerations are 
also controlled for. County fixed effects control for unobservable differences across counties, such as differences in 
clearance rates. The county variable lists the county in which the most recent crime for each inmate was committed. 
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3.5  Conclusions 
This paper explores the relationship between visible tattoos and recidivism. Within this 
analysis I measure recidivism as re-incarceration within a FDOC facility within a three year 
follow-up period. This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, I develop two 
classifications of tattoo visibility based on different types of workplace attire. Second, this paper 
expands on an existing literature on criminal signaling mechanisms and examines whether ex-
offenders with visible tattoos return to incarceration faster than ex-offenders with non-visible 
tattoos. This finding is robust to the different types of visibility developed within the paper.  
This study has a few key limitations. First, the estimates presented in this paper represent 
relationships and are not causal effects. Although I attempt to eliminate some of the selection 
effects associated with choosing to get a tattoo, I cannot control for unobservable factors related 
to the choice to get a tattoo. Additionally, individuals who choose to get highly visible tattoos 
(visible_1) may be inherently different from individuals who choose to get tattoos that can be 
covered in some cases (visible_2). Given my current dataset, I am unable to obtain causal 
estimates. Second, the data only contain information on reincarceration in prisons in Florida. 
Thus, I have no information on rearrest, time spent in jail, or crimes committed outside Florida. 
Given this limitation I cannot consider definitions of recidivism tied to jail time or rearrest. Thus, 
it is possible I am underestimating the amount of recidivism occurring. Future research should 
examine causal effects and the additional recidivism tied to jail and out-of-state crimes. 
 The FDOC website lists the daily average cost of housing an inmate at $47.50 and the 
average annual cost per inmate at $17,338. Looking at the most complete specification, in table 
3.3b column (3), the decrease in expected survival length of 419 days, equates to a cost of 
$19,903 per inmate with a visible_1 tattoo. Within the FDOC sample of inmates released during 
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2008, 2009, or 2010, 20,990 inmates have tattoos located on their head, face, neck, or hands. The 
per inmate cost of $19,903 adds up to a total cost of almost $418 million in housing costs over 
the three release years I consider. Of course, this back of the envelope calculation may be 
imprecise; however it reflects an important finding regarding the impact of tattoos as a signaling 
mechanism for ex-offenders to employers. Future research in this area should be expanded to 
consider the causal effect of personal appearance on inmate survival post-release.   
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Chapter 4 
Does Distance between Residence and Incarceration Facility Affect 
Recidivism?  Evidence from the Florida Department of Corrections 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Previous research suggests familial support is an important factor for reducing the risk of 
recidivism and that visitation while incarcerated reduces the risk of reoffense upon release (Bales 
and Mears, 2008).  However in 2004, 62 percent of state inmates and 84 percent of federal 
inmates served time over 100 miles from their residence at the time of arrest (The Sentencing 
Project, 2009).  As distance between residence and prison increases, so too does the cost of 
visitation for family members of incarcerated individuals. That relationship implies that as 
distance increases visitation frequency declines.  If inmates receiving visits while incarcerated 
are less likely to return to prison in the future, it is possible that housing inmates long distances 
from potential visitors may positively affect future crime rates. 
However some research concludes that the expectation of serving time in an isolated area 
may serve as a deterrent for criminal behavior, arguing that siting prisons in isolated locations 
deters crime by increasing the costliness of incarceration (Bedard and Helland, 2004).  
Increasing the isolation of female penitentiaries may reduce both violent and property crime rates 
in the area (Bedard and Helland, 2004).  Drago et al. (2011) also examine the relationship 
between distance and recidivism risk and find evidence of a positive relationship.  This suggests 
as distance to the main town increases, the probability of rearrest during the follow up period 
increases.  They argue that this may be due to the lack of volunteers and religious figures visiting 
more isolated prisons.  
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Taken together, these two studies reach conflicting conclusions.  For women, the 
expectation of serving time far from home is found to deter female crime (Bedard and Helland, 
2004).  However, when looking at Italian inmates Drago et al. (2011) find that inmates who 
serve time in geographically isolated prisons are more likely to reoffend upon release.  Despite 
these conflicting findings, few studies have focused specifically on the relationship between 
home to prison distance and recidivism.  
Distance between prison and the home of family and friends is an important determinant 
of whether or not visitations occur.  As distance increases so too do transportation costs for 
potential visitors.  This paper contributes to the literature by focusing on the relationship between 
home to prison distance and recidivism.  If distance is related to recidivism risk, either positively 
or negatively, then correctional policy may prioritize geographic placement of inmates to reduce 
crime and correctional costs in the future.   
Both Bedard and Helland (2004) and Drago et al. (2011) measure a prison’s geographic 
isolation relative to the city.  However, if an inmate’s friends and family do not live close to the 
city, then distance between prison and city is not the relevant measure.  I assume that the 
residence to which an inmate is released is highly correlated with the location of potential 
visitors.    Using inmate-level data from the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC), I 
examine whether inmates incarcerated farther from their residence return to incarceration faster 
or more frequently than inmates housed closer to home. The unique data from FDOC provide the 
address to which an inmate is released and the incarceration facility for prison spells of inmates 
in Florida. The release address provides a unique insight into where an inmate’s support system 
likely resides.  Thus, my measure of distance is based on the distance between the inmate’s 
planned residence upon release and the incarceration facility. 
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To test the hypothesis that home to prison distance is related to recidivism, I begin with 
Ordinary Least Squares regressions and examine the average relationship between distance and 
recidivism.  Next, I use a survival methodology to account for both the timing and occurrence of 
recidivism.  This individual-level dataset allows for the control of age, gender, race, 
incarceration history, differences across counties, and whether previous crimes were violent or 
property related.  I examine the sample of Florida offenders who were not currently incarcerated 
as of October 2013, and follow those offenders within Florida until January 2015.   
Although FDOC officials attempt to place inmates in facilities close to their homes, the 
majority of inmates, roughly 75%, come from South or Central Florida, and the majority of 
prison beds are located in North Florida.  This translates into a spatial mismatch of inmates to 
beds.  As such, all inmates cannot be placed close to home.  The FDOC inmate classification 
bureau assigns inmates to their initial placement within an FDOC facility.  According to the 
bureau, these initial placements are based primarily on bed space and as such most inmates are 
not initially placed close to home.   
 
4.2 Layout of Correctional Facilities in Florida69 
The Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) separates its facilities into three regions across 
the state.  Region 1 is comprised of North Florida, Region 2 is Central Florida, and Region 3 is 
South Florida.  A depiction of how these regions are separated across the state is shown in Figure 
4.1.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Unless otherwise stated, the information in this section comes from http://www.dc.state.fl.us/facilities.  
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Figure 4.1:  Map of FDOC Regions. 
 
Source:  FDOC, October 2014 
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Within each region, there are several FDOC facilities of different types ranging from 
work camps to maximum-security prisons depending on the facility and region.  A detailed map 
of the North Florida region, Region 1, including a legend, is shown in Figure 4.2.  Region 1 
includes 29 FDOC facilities with 15 major prisons located in this region.  Figure 4.3 presents a 
detailed map of Region 2, which includes 26 FDOC facilities and 17 major prisons located in 
Central Florida.  The detailed map of Region 3, South Florida, is presented in Figure 4.4.  Region 
3 includes 46 FDOC facilities, with 16 major prisons. Although the number of institutions is 
relatively evenly distributed across regions, the distribution of inmates is not.   
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Figure 4.2:  Detailed Map of FDOC Region 1 with Legend. 
 
 
Source:  FDOC, October 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
 
Figure 4.3: Detailed map of FDOC Region 2 with Legend. 
 
 
Source:  FDOC, October 2014 
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Figure 4.4:  Detailed map of FDOC Region 3 with Legend. 
 
 
Source:  FDOC, October 2014 
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Figure 4.5 presents a breakdown of offenders based on the county of their arrest and the 
location of the prison where they served time for that offense.    Roughly 43% of offenders 
served time in a facility located in Region 1, but only 13% of offenders were arrested for crimes 
committed in Region 1.  Region 2 is more evenly distributed across these dimensions, with 25% 
of offenders housed in Region 2 and 18% arrested in Region 2.  Region 3 presents the largest 
spatial mismatch between arrest location and facility with 70% of offenders arrested in the 
region, and only 33% housed in the region.  This figure shows that the majority of offenders in 
Florida are arrested in the South Florida region yet serve time in the North Florida Region. 
Figure 4.5: Offender Arrest and Housing Locations by Region. 
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This spatial mismatch between an inmate’s institutional location and their home has 
potentially important implications for offenders upon release. As distance from home increases, 
so too do transportation costs for family and friends of the offender.  As transportation costs 
increase, the likelihood of visitation decreases.  Decreases in visitations have the potential to 
either positively or negatively affect recidivism in the future. 
 
4.3 Previous Literature 
Broadly speaking, visitation while incarcerated may be beneficial to inmates as it allows for the 
maintenance of social ties to family and friends outside of prison.  Evidence suggests that 
inmates who receive visitors may better transition back into society post-release due to 
connections to employment and living situations (Liu et al., 2014).  However, the mechanism 
through which recidivism risk is affected may be dependent on the relationship between the 
inmate and visitor.   
Visits from family members such as parents or spouses have been found to have the 
largest impact on decreasing recidivism risk in the future.  Studies examining why visits from 
family are relatively important to reducing future criminal behavior find a positive relationship 
between family visits and the probability of obtaining employment post release (Liu et al., 2004; 
Berg and Huebner, 2011; Duwe and Clark, 2011).  Employment post release has been shown to 
reduce recidivism risk (Freeman, 2003; Liu et al, 2004; Tahmincioglu, 2010; Berg and Huebner, 
2011; Duwe and Clark, 2011; Husock, 2012, Pia Negro, 2012; Rosenberg, 2012).  While family 
visits overall are potentially beneficial, visits from ex-spouses close to release have been shown 
to increase the risk of reconviction in the future (Duwe and Clark, 2011).  This finding suggests 
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that the relationship between the inmate and the visitor may determine whether visits are 
beneficial. 
Visits from friends of the inmate have the potential to shape their perception of how their 
incarceration has affected others.  Liu et al. (2014) find that inmates who are frequently visited 
by friends are more likely to believe their incarceration has been difficult on others than inmates 
whose friends do not visit, or visit less frequently.  Additionally, offenders who believe their 
prison spell was difficult for loved ones are less likely to reoffend in the future.   
These previous studies suggest that when visitations do occur they have the potential to 
decrease future criminal activity, depending on the relationship between the inmate and the 
visitor.  However, not all inmates receive visits while incarcerated.  Duwe and Clark (2011) 
report that 39% of inmates are never visited during incarceration.  A variety of factors, including 
individual characteristics, may affect whether or not an inmate receives visitors while serving 
time.  A main barrier to visitation reported by relatives and friends of prisoners is the cost of 
transportation to the prison (Bedard and Helland, 2004). 
Prisoners housed in isolated prison locations are less likely to receive visitors and thus 
less likely to internalize the effects of visitation while incarcerated (Bedard and Helland, 2004).  
The potential effects of serving time with infrequent visitations on an inmate’s social 
connections are well documented within the literature.  However, the relationship between 
distance and crime has received far less attention.  Bedard and Helland (2004) use natural 
variation in the expansion of women’s prisons to examine the effects of prison isolation on 
female crime rates.  Their results suggest that an increase the expected distance between 
residence and incarceration facility causes a decrease in the female crime rate.  This evidence of 
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the deterrent effect of prison isolation is in line with Becker’s (1968) theory of the economics of 
crime.  
This deterrence argument rests on the assumption that distance and visitation are 
negatively related and that a lack of visitation is punitive in nature.  In order to justify these 
assumptions, Bedard and Helland (2004) compile data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 
Survey of Inmates (1997) and show that female inmates incarcerated more than 50 miles from 
their residence at the time of arrest, are less likely to receive visits or phone calls while serving 
time.  Furthermore, evidence suggests that prison visitation may be prohibitively costly due to 
high transportation costs.   
Given that distance and visitation are related, how does a lack of visitation affect the 
inmate, and should this be considered a component of the harshness of incarceration?  Becker’s 
(1973) economic theory of the household includes time spent with children as a utility producing 
consumption good for parents. Bedard and Helland (2004) extend this consumption component 
to all individuals, including those serving time.  This suggests that a lack of visitation while 
incarcerated deprives inmates of the utility gained from spending time with loved ones.  As a 
result, they conclude the geographic isolation of a prison is a punitive measure.   
Their analysis focuses specifically on female offenders and finds that geographic prison 
isolation has a deterrent effect on crimes committed by women.  The mechanism with which this 
deterrence operates is the threat of forgone utility from the lack of visitation from family and 
friends. It follows from this line of reasoning that men should also be affected by distance 
between prison and home, as they too gain utility from visitation.  
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 In this paper, I expand Bedard and Helland’s (2004) study and examine whether the 
experience of serving time in a geographically isolated prison locations deters future crimes.  If 
what deters female offenders from committing crimes is the inability to ‘consume’ the utility 
from visitation, then male offenders should also value this forgone consumption and respond 
accordingly. Using a survival model, I test whether a relationship exists between prison to 
residence distance and the timing and occurrence of recidivism.   
 
4.4 Data and Empirical Approach 
To examine this question, I use data from the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) 
Offender Based Information System (OBIS) in October 2013 and January 2015.70  These open-
records databases provide information on offenders within FDOC facilities.71  From the October 
2013 file, I create demographic, criminal history, and distance variables for Florida offenders 
who were not currently incarcerated in Florida during October 2013.  The January 2015 
information lists all inmates currently serving time in FDOC facilities in January 2015.  
Combining these databases allows me to calculate the occurrence and timing of recidivism for 
inmates who returned to prison by January 2015.  Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of the 
variables included in this analysis. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 The October 2013 database was the earliest database I had access to at the start of this project.  This database 
provides information on offenders who have passed through the FDOC system since 1997 but were not currently 
incarcerated as of October 2013.   
71 Only incarcerations in Florida prisons are included in this database. 
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics.  
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Survival Indicators 
Survival 77202 0.931 0.253 0 1 
Days until recidivism 5323 1346 1087 62 7736 
      
Distance Indicators      
Distance  (Release to Facility, mi) 77202 157.312 123.486 1.279 579.784 
      
Demographic Controls 
Black 77202 0.575 0.494 0 1 
Asian/Pacific Islander 77202 0.00004 0.006 0 1 
Hispanic 77202 0.020 0.142 0 1 
White 77202 0.402 0.490 0 1 
American Indian 77202 0.0008 0.028 0 1 
Age at release 77202 39.807 9.933 17.649 85.614 
Gender 77202 0.914 0.280 0 1 
      
Criminal Controls 
Violent offense in history 77202 0.330 0.470 0 1 
Property offense in history 77202 0.484 0.500 0 1 
Number of previous incarcerations 77202 3.276 1.777 1 16 
Community custody level 77202 0.129 0.335 0 1 
Minimum custody level 77202 0.270 0.444 0 1 
Medium custody level 77702 0.405 0.491 0 1 
Close custody level 77202 0.174 0.379 0 1 
Maximum custody level 77202 0.00001 0.004 0 1 
Visible Tattoo 51938 0.247 0.431 0 1 
 
 Prior to release, all inmates are required to create a release plan which includes an 
address at which they plan to reside once out of prison.  This plan is updated up until the day the 
inmate is released from prison and is assumed to capture the location of an inmate’s family 
and/or friends.  To calculate a measure of distance between family and friends of an inmate and 
their incarceration location, I calculate the distance in miles between the release plan ZIP code 
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and the ZIP code of the prison in which the inmate is serving time.  The average distance 
between these locations is 157 miles.  Previous work by Bedard and Helland (2004) and Drago et 
al. (2011) measures distance at the city level. An advantage to the FDOC data is the 
measurement of distance by ZIP codes.  As ZIP codes are a more local level of analysis, the 
measure of distance I am able to construct is more precise than those used in previous studies. 
In addition to the distance variable, I construct two variables measuring outcomes for 
released offenders.  Survival indicates whether or not an inmate survived in society without 
being reincarcerated as of January 2015.72  Survival equals zero if an inmate was incarcerated as 
of January 2015, and equals 1otheriwse.  93% of offenders released as of October 2013 have yet 
to return to incarceration in Florida as of January 2015, while 7% of those released offenders are 
currently incarcerated.  I also calculate a variable which measures differences in timing of these 
returns to prison.  On average, an offender survives 1,346 days (3.7 years) before returning to 
prison.  The timing of reincarceration is important as differences in timing convey differences in 
offender characteristics related to recidivism.  Analyses which using binary indicators of 
recidivism may miss important information conveyed by differences in timing.  
 To control for demographic characteristics that may affect recidivism, I construct dummy 
variables for race and gender and calculate the age at release for each inmate.73 The sample of 
offenders included within this analysis is roughly 58% black, 40% white, 91% male, and has an 
average age of 40 years old.  I also control for criminal history factors which may affect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 This is typically referred to as ‘failure’, where failure equals 1 if an inmate returned to prison.  In order to be 
consistent across OLS and survival model results, I measure survival rather than failure.  The survival rate is equal 
to one minus the failure rate.   
73 The following studies suggest these demographic factors affect recidivism: Jurik, 1983; Blumstein et al., 1987; 
Beck and Shipley, 1987; Visher and Linster, 1990; Anderson et al., 1991; Visher et al., 1991; Helpburn and 
Albonetti, 1994; Gendreau et al., 1996; Baumer, 1997; Beck and Shipley 1997; Hanley and Latessa, 1997; Benedict 
et al, 1998; Gainey et al., 2000; Kruttschnitt et al., 2000; Uggen, 2000; Benda and Toombs, 2002; Langan and 
Levin, 2002; Spohn and Holleran, 2002; Langan et al., 2003; Kubrin and Stewart, 2006; Windzio, 2006; Bales and 
Mears, 2008; Duwe and Donnay, 2008; Kohl et al., 2008; Lozano et al., 2010, and Waters, 2012. 
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recidivism.  These include dummy variables for previous violent or property offenses in an 
inmate’s history74, custody levels, visible tattoos, and the number of times an inmate has been 
previously incarcerated.75  Within my sample, roughly 33% of inmates served time for a violent 
crime, 48% for a property crime, the average number of previous incarcerations is 3, and about 
40% of inmates are housed in medium custody.   
 To examine whether distance between residence and prison is related to recidivism, I 
begin by estimating the following OLS regression: 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙! = 𝛽!𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒! + 𝛽! 𝑋! + 𝛾! + 𝛿! + 𝜀!   (1) 
 
Where 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙! is a dummy variable which equals 0 if offender 𝑖 is incarcerated as of January 
2015, and 1 otherwise.  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒! measures the distance in miles between offender 𝑖’s release 
plan residence and the prison where they were most recently incarcerated.  𝑋! is a set of 
demographic and criminal history control variables which may affect the likelihood of survival.  
County fixed effects are represented by 𝛾! and control for factors specific to the county offender 𝑖 was arrested in which may affect the survival rate.76  𝛿! indicates a prison-level fixed effect to 
control for facility specific attributes that may affect the likelihood of survival for offender 𝑖.  
 When examining recidivism it is important to take into account not only the occurrence 
of a return to prison, but also the timing of that occurrence. Differences in timing reflect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Violent and property crime dummy variables are calculated using FBI definitions of violent and property crimes.   
75 I can only measure incarcerations within Florida prisons given the nature of the data. 
76 For example, perhaps Miami-Dade County is especially efficient at incarcerating offenders.  The county fixed 
effect controls for differences across counties related to recidivism. 
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differences in costs to the correctional system.  Additionally, using only binary indicators to 
measure recidivism treats an offender who returned to prison after one month the same as an 
offender who survived several years before reincarceration.  In order to properly account for the 
differences in timing of imprisonment across inmates, I utilize a survival analysis framework.  I 
define survival length as the number of days between inmate 𝑖’s most recent release and their 
next receipt into prison.  The general survival function of inmate 𝑖 can be represented by the 
following equation: 
 𝑆! = exp   − ℎ 𝑇; 𝑥!𝛾 𝑑𝑇!!      (2) 
 Where 𝑆! represents the number of days inmate 𝑖 survives in society without experiencing 
a return to prison.  ℎ(. ) indicates the hazard rate of reincarceration, which is a function of 
variables which may affect recidivism, given by 𝑥! with the coefficient vector 𝛾, and the current 
and total time periods included in the analysis, represented by 𝑡 and 𝑇 respectively.   
 To estimate the hazard rate for survival within my analysis, I use a log-logistic 
distribution for the starting hazard.  This flexible functional form allows for non-monotonic 
hazard functions.  The modified log-logistic hazard function is shown in equation 3. 
ℎ 𝑡; 𝑥!𝛾 = !"# !!! !!!!!!!!"# !!! !!        (3) 
Where 𝜆 describes the relationship between the hazard and duration.  In the log-logistic 
distribution, 𝜆 < 1 indicates declining hazard over time, and 𝜆 > 1   indicates a hazard rate which 
increases then falls. 
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4.5  Results 
OLS 
I begin by examining the relationship between distance and survival using OLS.  In these 
regressions, the dependent variable is an indicator which equals 1 if the offender was actively 
incarcerated as of January 2015, and equals 0 otherwise.  Table 4.2 presents the regression 
results examining the relationship between survival and distance.  Column (1) presents results 
including control variables, and column (2) adds the inclusion of county and prison-level fixed 
effects.   
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Table 4.2: Relationship between Distance and Survival Indicator. 
 (1) (2) Distance from Prison to Residence 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Black -0.077*** -0.083*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.009 -0.012 
 (0.013) (0.023) 
Hispanic -0.064*** -0.073*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
White -0.074*** -0.076*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
American Indian -0.055 -0.058 
 (0.035) (0.037) 
Age at release 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender -0.009** -0.023** 
 (0.004) (0.012) 
Visible Tattoo (face, head, neck, hands) -0.029*** -0.026*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Violent offense in history 0.010*** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Property offense in history -0.009*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of previous incarcerations -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Community custody level 0.021** 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
Minimum custody level 0.007 -0.000 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
Medium custody level 0.005 -0.000 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
Close custody level 0.005 -0.000 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
Fixed Effects No Yes 
Observations 51,938 51,938 
Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Significance is denoted by *** , **, and * indicating p<0.01, p<0.05, 
and p<0.1 respectively. The dependent variable in this analysis =1 if an offender had not returned to prison in 
Florida as of January 2015. County fixed effects control for unobservable differences across counties, such as 
differences in clearance rates. The county variable lists the county in which the most recent crime for each inmate 
was committed. Facility fixed effects are also included and control for prison-specific effects that may affect the 
likelihood of survival post-release. 
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 Both specifications suggest a positive and significant relationship exists between distance 
and the probability of survival outside of prison, however the magnitude on this effect is very 
small.  All of the control variables included within the analysis follow the expected signs with 
the exception of the violent dummy variable indicating whether an inmate has a violent offense 
in their history.77 Race, gender (male=1), previous property offenses, previous incarcerations, 
and visible tattoos all show evidence of a negative relationship with survival.  Additionally, as 
age increases so too does the probability of survival.   
 The OLS analysis is limited in its ability to capture differences across inmates conveyed 
by differences in timing between prison spells.  It is important to account for the timing of 
recidivism as differences in timing convey differences in unobservable inmate characteristics as 
well as costs paid by the correctional system.  To account for these differences in timing, a 
survival model is used in the second portion of the analysis.  
SURVIVAL MODEL 
Survival models utilize a two-part dependent variable to account for whether or not failure takes 
place as well as differences in timing until failure for each subject.  In the context of this study, 
the dependent variable includes a dummy variable for whether or not an offender returned to 
prison as well as the number of days between release from prison and reincarceration.  Survival 
analysis adds an additional dimension to analyses of recidivism as differences in days survived in 
society are accounted for.   
The results from the survival analysis are presented in Table 4.3.  Column 1 presents 
results for the relationship between the likelihood of survival and distance, with the inclusion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 The result for violent offenders suggests that increases in distance are associated with increases in the expected 
probability of survival outside of prison.  It is possible that being farther away from family and friends is more 
beneficial to a violent offender’s reform than criminals with other previous offense types. 
106 
 
control variables.  Column 2 again expands on column 1 with county and prison-level fixed 
effects.  For ease of interpretation, results are presented in time ratio format.  Time ratio 
coefficients indicate how estimated survival length is affected by a one unit change in a given 
independent variable, where time ratios greater than one indicate increases in estimated survival 
length equal to the coefficient minus one.   
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Table 4.3: Loglogisitc Survival Regression Results for the Relationship between Distance and Survival, 
Time Ratios Presented. 
 (1) (2) 
Distance from Prison to Residence 1.001*** 1.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Black 0.013** 0.011** 
 (0.025) (0.021) 
Asian/Pacific Islander 2.160*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Hispanic 0.019** 0.015** 
 (0.036) (0.028) 
White 0.015** 0.013** 
 (0.027) (0.025) 
American Indian 0.025* 0.022* 
 (0.056) (0.050) 
Age at release 1.063*** 1.064*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Gender 0.769* 0.456* 
 (0.108) (0.192) 
Visible Tattoo (face, head, neck, hands) 0.485*** 0.523*** 
 (0.034) (0.037) 
Violent offense in history 1.301*** 1.187** 
 (0.092) (0.085) 
Property offense in history 0.773*** 0.706*** 
 (0.053) (0.049) 
Number of previous incarcerations 0.760*** 0.756*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
Community custody level 1.904*** 1.071 
 (0.462) (0.298) 
Minimum custody level 1.181 0.972 
 (0.267) (0.246) 
Medium custody level 1.130 0.987 
 (0.250) (0.244) 
Close custody level 0.807 0.699 
 (0.183) (0.177) 
Fixed Effects No Yes 
Observations 51,938 51,938 
Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Significance is denoted by *** , **, and * indicating p<0.01, p<0.05, 
and p<0.1 respectively. . The dependent variable in this analysis is comprised of two parts, a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not an inmate had returned to prison in Florida as of January 2015, and a timing variable 
indicating the number of days an inmate ‘survived’ in society.  County fixed effects control for unobservable 
differences across counties, such as differences in clearance rates. The county variable lists the county in which the 
most recent crime for each inmate was committed. Facility fixed effects are also included and control for prison-
specific effects that may affect the likelihood of survival post-release. 
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 Overall, the findings using the survival framework suggest a positive relationship exists 
between distance and expected survival time.  Columns (1) and (2) both show that increases in 
distance are associated with increases in the number of days an inmate survives in society.  This 
result is consistent with OLS results, which suggest that as the distance between an inmate’s 
home and prison increases, they become less likely to return to prison. The control variables in 
this portion of the analysis again follow the expected signs with the exception of the dummy 
variable for violent offenders.  
 Time ratio coefficient values greater than one correspond to increases in expected 
survival times.  The coefficient on the distance measure used within this analysis is 1.001 in the 
most complete specification of Table 4.3 Column 2.  Given this coefficient is greater than one, it 
suggests that a one mile increase in distance is associated with a 0.1% increase in expected 
survival time. From that relationship, a one standard deviation increase in distance of 123.486 
miles is associated with a 12.349% increase in expected survival time.  The average offender 
included within the analysis survives in society 1,346 days (3.688 years).  Thus, a one standard 
deviation increase in distance is associated with an increase in the average offender’s expected 
survival time of 166 days.   
The findings from both the OLS and survival models are consistent with the work of 
Bedard and Helland (2004) which found that more isolated prisons have a deterrent effect on 
crimes.  Although their work was specific to women, the results from my analysis suggest that 
this deterrent effect may apply generally to offenders who have the experience of isolated 
incarceration. Given the mechanism behind the deterrent effect in Bedard and Helland (2004) 
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was the forgone utility from the lack of visitation, it is unsurprising that both male and female 
offenders are affected by serving time in a geographically isolated prison. 
 Overall, the findings from these regressions suggest that distance and survival are 
positively related. The OLS results suggest that increases in distance are associated with 
increases in the likelihood of survival.  The survival results show that increases in distance are 
also associated with increases in expected survival times of inmates. 
4.6  Conclusions 
In this paper, I examine how distance between an inmate’s prison and residence affects 
recidivism upon release.  I first present results from OLS regressions of the relationship between 
whether an inmate returns to prison and home to prison distance.  However, when examining 
how distance relates to recidivism it is important to account for both the timing and occurrence 
of recidivism for several reasons.  First, differences in the timing between prison spells indicate 
differences in costs paid by the criminal justice system to house inmates.  Second, using only 
binary indicators to measure recidivism treats an offender who returns to prison shortly after 
release as identical to an offender who survives several years post-release without another prison 
sentence.  I use a survival model in order to capture the information conveyed by differences in 
timing.  
 The results from the OLS regressions suggest that as distance between an inmate’s 
residence and prison increases, so too does the probability of survival.  However, using OLS 
does not account for the differences in timing between incarcerations across inmates.  When 
using a survival framework, the results again suggest a positive relationship between distance 
and the likelihood of survival.  The interpretation of the survival model time ratio coefficient can 
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be expressed as a number of days.  For every additional standard deviation increase in distance 
between prison and residence, the estimated number of days the average inmate survives in 
society increases by 166.   
 Previous research examining the role of geographic isolation of prison in future criminal 
behavior has conflicting results.  Several studies find that allowing inmates to serve time closer 
to family reduces recidivism risk, as inmates are better able to maintain social ties while 
incarcerated (Bales and Mears, 2008; Duwe and Clark, 2011;, Liu et al., 2014).  However, 
findings from Bedard and Helland (2004) suggest that a more isolated prison environment is a 
deterrent for female offenders.  The results from my analysis are consistent with Bedard and 
Helland’s (2004) finding that geographic prison isolation is positively related to the likelihood of 
survival post-release. 
 It should be noted that these results are meaningful if the release residence measure 
captures the residence location of an inmate’s personal connections outside of prison.  These 
personal connections are likely the individuals visiting the inmate while incarcerated.  Future 
work should examine other measures of residence and distance to ensure the robustness of this 
finding.  Additionally, these findings do not present causal impacts and rely on the extent to 
which prison assignment is random.  Future analyses should take into account the process of 
prison placement for inmates in Florida.  
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Chapter 5 
Summary and Conclusion 
Government policy has long been used to try to improve the lives of citizens.  Recently, 
two main areas of importance to policymakers have been improving economic opportunities in 
low-income areas and finding low-cost solutions to decrease crime.  The essays in this 
dissertation discuss three policy-relevant topics within those fields.    I contribute to the scholarly 
literature in the areas of each research chapter by providing empirical evidence of the 
effectiveness of policies and programs aimed at helping low-income communities and reducing 
criminal behavior.   
Chapter 2 examines the effect of a specific federal tax credit program on attracting new 
businesses and employment to low-income communities.    The NMTC program provides federal 
income tax credits to private investors willing to invest in projects in eligible low-income 
communities.    Using data from the Dun and Bradstreet Marketplace files and the US Census, 
we examine whether this program attracted new businesses and employment to eligible census 
tracts.   Since business owners choose where to locate, comparing the number of new businesses 
in eligible low-income communities to the number of new businesses in ineligible communities 
is likely to produce biased results.  In order to avoid that potential endogeneity, we combine a 
difference-in-differences strategy with a regression discontinuity framework.  This allows for the 
comparison of just eligible tracts to just ineligible tracts, before and after the program was 
implemented.   
The results in Chapter 2 suggest that the NMTC was able to attract new businesses and 
employment to eligible census tracts.  Looking at employment in new firms, we find an increase 
in new employment in just eligible tracts after the program was implemented.  Similarly, when 
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examining the number of new businesses after the NMTC began, our results show an increase in 
the number of new firms in just eligible tracts.   However, the significance of these overall 
effects is not consistent across the eligibility ratio cutoff ranges considered.  It is possible that 
differences in industry composition may be responsible for the differences in significance across 
years.   
Previous research suggests that examining the overall effect of programs that subsidize 
capital or labor may miss important differences in underlying industry-specific effects.  Hanson 
and Rohlin (2011b) develop a formal model of the relationship between labor subsidies and the 
location choices of labor-intensive and capital-intensive firms.  The main implication of their 
model is that geographic areas where labor is subsidized are able to attract more labor-intensive 
industries, as businesses in those industries will be willing to bid more to locate in the subsidized 
areas.   
Our research builds off of Hanson and Rohlin (2011b) and examines whether the NMTC 
attracts more new businesses in industries with higher capital start up costs. Although the NMTC 
is written such that it can be used for any purpose, in practice investors use it for capital-
intensive projects.  As such, we consider the NMTC to be a capital tax credit.  When capital is 
subsidized, the price of capital in relation to labor also changes.  Additionally, capital and labor 
tend to be highly substitutable and as a result it is possible that improvements in capital may 
substitute away increases in unskilled labor.  McCulloch and Yellen (1979) formalize this 
relationship and find evidence that when capital becomes cheaper, capital-intensive firms may 
respond by improving capital at the expense of unskilled workers.   
Our by industry results show that the NMTC attracted new businesses in several 
industries in eligible tracts.  However, new employment only increased in the FIRE and services 
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industries.  This finding is consistent with findings from McCulloch and Yellen (1979), which 
argue that when capital is subsidized firms may choose to invest in capital at the expense of 
unskilled labor.  It is unsurprising that FIRE and services still experience increases in 
employment after a capital subsidy.  First, the FIRE industry typically does not consist of 
unskilled labor.  As such, capital and labor are not likely highly substitutable in this industry.  
Second, capital has not become technologically advanced enough to be highly substitutable with 
labor in the services industry.   
In Chapter 3, I examine the relationship between visible tattoos and recidivism.  Potential 
employers may interpret visible tattoos as a signal of other unobservable characteristics.  As 
such, visible tattoos may serve as a barrier to entering the labor force.  Ex-offenders face many 
barriers to gaining employment post release.  Additionally, ex-offenders are particularly 
important labor force participants as research suggests that employment plays an important role 
in reducing future criminal behavior.  A large body of research has examined the factors that 
contribute to the likelihood of future criminal activity for repeat offenders.  However, very few 
studies focus on the role that personal appearance may play in affecting the likelihood of future 
incarceration.  
I contribute to a small but growing literature examining how visible tattoos, one aspect of 
an ex-offender’s appearance, affect future criminal activity. Two recent criminology studies 
examine the relationship between tattoos and future criminal behavior.  Lozano et al. (2010) 
consider three sample of individuals: inmates with prison tattoos, inmates with non-prison 
tattoos, and college students. Their findings suggest that inmates with tattoos are more likely to 
commit future crimes than inmates without prison tattoos and college students. Waters (2012) 
expands upon Lozano et al. (2010) and examines the relationship between visible tattoos and 
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recidivism. His results suggest that inmates with visible tattoos are more likely to be reconvicted 
for new felony offenses and new violent offenses within three years.  
In Chapter 3, I expand upon those previous studies by developing two measures of 
visibility and utilizing a survival model to take into account the timing and occurrence of 
criminal behavior.  I utilize a log-logistic survival model to allow for a flexible hazard function. 
The results from the survival analysis suggest that inmates with highly visible tattoos return to 
prison faster and more often than inmates with other, less visible, tattoos.  The most conservative 
estimate suggests that inmates with tattoos on their face, head, neck, or hands return to prison 
roughly 419 days sooner than inmates with tattoos on arms or legs.   
The findings from this chapter have important policy implications.  Some small scale 
reentry programs are teaching ex-offenders, in particular ex-gang members, how to use makeup 
to effectively cover visible tattoos.  Additionally, a number of non-profit organizations are 
beginning to offer subsidized or free tattoo removal for criminals with visible tattoos.  The 
findings from my analysis suggest that visible tattoos may play an important role in an ex-
offender’s ability to reenter society.  Future research in this area should examine further the 
value of obtaining a tattoo removal, both to the individual and to tax payers. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the relationship between prison isolation and recidivism.  
Specifically, I examine whether the distance between and offender’s home and incarceration 
location is related to the timing and occurrence of recidivism in the future.  Two competing 
theories on this relationship prevail in the literature.  There are potential benefits of housing 
offenders close to home as they are better able to maintain social ties to family and friends while 
incarcerated.  Research suggests this may be associated with better behavior inside prison, and an 
easier transition into legitimate employment post-release (Liu et al., 2004; Berg and Huebner, 
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2011; Duwe and Clark, 2011).  Another area of research suggests however that harsh prison 
conditions may be a deterrent to crime for female offenders (Bedard and Helland, 2004).  
Specifically, as the expected distance between home and prison increases, the female crime rate 
within a city drops.   
Using data from the Florida Department of Corrections Offender Based Information 
System (FDOC OBIS) database, I examine whether distance and recidivism are related.  If the 
expectation of serving time far away is a deterrent for female offenders, does the experience of 
serving time far from home deter future crime from the individuals who experienced the 
isolation?  The results from both survival and OLS estimations suggests that as distance between 
an offender’s home and prison increases, the likelihood they will return to prison in the future 
decreases.   
Again the findings from this analysis have important policy implications.  Department of 
Corrections official are faced with limited budgets and housing options.  If inmates housed 
farther away from home are deterred from committing future crimes based on that experience, 
then housing offenders far from home may have the potential to reduce crime rates and costs in 
the future.  Additionally, decisions about technology based visitation systems (i.e. Skype) for 
inmates housed farther from home should take these results into account.  
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